Pablo Ocampo served in the House as Resident Commissioner only briefly, but he was a powerful force on behalf of Philippine nationhood. From his early days as a leader in the revolutionary government to his election to the U.S. House of Representatives, Ocampo helped shape the terms of the Philippines’ relationship with America. On Capitol Hill, he fought to protect the archipelago’s economy from what he considered an unbalanced trade deal and worked to further the concerns of the Philippine assembly. He was, according to Sereno Payne of New York, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, “a gentleman of education, a lawyer, and a man of ability.”1 Ocampo was not fluent in English, but during his time as Resident Commissioner, he spoke compellingly for his home islands.
Pablo Ocampo was born on January 25, 1853, to an established Manila family.2 He attended Colegio de San Juan de Letran before graduating from the University of Santo Tomas in Manila in 1882. After studying law, Ocampo passed the bar and began practicing in Manila, starting what would become a very diverse career. From 1883 to 1884, he served as the prosecuting attorney in Manila’s Tondo District along Manila Bay. And then, under the Spanish regime, he served as secretary of the royal court from 1885 to 1887 and as relator of the supreme court from 1887 to 1888. From 1888 to 1890, he was an adviser to the Economic Association of the Philippines.3
When the war broke out between the Philippines and Spain, Ocampo severed his ties with the empire and joined the revolution. The Spanish arrested him and threw him in jail in 1896, but Ocampo remained committed to the cause and became a close adviser to Emilio Aguinaldo, the general leading the insurrection. In 1898, as the United States beefed up its presence in the South Pacific, Ocampo was elected to the Philippines’ revolutionary congress at Malolos, a town approximately 30 miles north of Manila.4
Ocampo’s relationship with the U.S. occupying forces was rocky from the start. In 1899 the United States arrested him for his work with the revolution. Although he was eventually released, Ocampo stayed on America’s radar.5 During his time in Manila, Ocampo became the editor of La Patria, a newspaper openly critical of American occupation.6 According to a Los Angeles Times correspondent in the Philippines, Ocampo was also reported to have been the mastermind behind the insurrection’s intelligence operation, sending agents throughout Manila, Hong Kong, and other points in the Pacific. “His office was really the distributing point of all aid for the insurrectionists,” the reporter said, “and he solicited contributions to keep up the battle.”7
The reach of Ocampo’s newspaper, alongside his history with Philippine nationalists, made United States authorities in the Philippines extremely nervous, so much so that, in the first part of 1901, American military officials deported him to the island of Guam, 1,500 miles to the east, where his political views on Philippine independence would be safely contained. But Ocampo’s repeated imprisonments, first by the Spanish and then by the Americans, in addition to his work with the revolutionary government, may have only heightened his standing. Writing in the widely read Harper’s Weekly a few years later, George H. Blakeslee, a leading American authority in the field of international relations, took stock of Ocampo’s repeated sacrifices and concluded that the Manila lawyer was “a Filipino patriot.”8
After spending two years exiled in Guam, Ocampo returned home. Despite concerns about his future in the Philippines, the former rebel leader took the loyalty oath to the United States and kept a comparatively low profile, focusing on his law practice.9 His politics also seemed more moderate. While Ocampo was gone, U.S. civil authorities, led by governor and future U.S. President William H. Taft, began exerting greater control over the Philippines. They worked closely with the Philippine Partido Federal (Federal Party), which saw U.S. occupation as a stabilizing force. It was a necessary evil that Ocampo hoped was a prelude to Philippine nationhood, a goal he now believed could be negotiated peacefully.10
Not long after he returned home, Ocampo fell in with a newly formed group of Filipino elites called the Comité de Intereses Filipinos (Committee of Filipino Interests), which opposed America’s imperial government. Although the new group included a number of former revolutionaries, the committee’s ambitions were rather moderate. “It functioned mainly as a coalition of oppositionists promoting the welfare of the indigenous population,” wrote Michael Cullinane, a historian of Philippine politics. The committee was something of a political incubator, helping leaders of the opposition form an agenda. “The primary accomplishment of the Comité,” Cullinane observed, “was that it provided an organization that brought together many of the men who eventually emerged as the leaders of the Partido Nacionalista in 1907.”11
The Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party) was first conceived in 1906, the result of efforts to unite the many different opposition leaders in Manila. For much of the preceding decade, politics in the Philippines was unbalanced: there was the pro-American Partido Federal and then there was everyone else, a loose affiliation of factions opposed to American rule. These opposition groups all sought Philippine independence, but subscribed to different levels of urgency—everything from immediate independence to much more gradual freedom.
Ocampo, along with a number of his politically moderate colleagues from the committee, gravitated to a burgeoning party called Comité de la Unión Nacional (Committee of the National Union). Although its members did not push for immediate independence, they did seem to want it sooner rather than later. Eventually, in the spring of 1907, Manila’s nationalist elements, led by the Comité de la Unión Nacional, fused together to form the Partido Nacionalista, offering a stark contrast to the Federalistas’ agenda (the Partido Federal changed its name to Partido Nacional Progresista [National Progressive Party] in 1907).12
The effort to unite the nationalist camps was still lurching forward when the campaign for the new Philippine assembly began. As part of the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, Congress created a bicameral legislature for the Philippines in which the commission functioned much like the U.S. Senate while the assembly would be popularly elected and fill a role similar to the U.S. House of Representatives.13 It had taken five years, but by the summer of 1907, the Philippines was preparing to cast its first ballots for a popularly elected governing body when Ocampo entered the race.
The philosophical differences which made it so difficult to unify independence supporters in the first place remained a problem. During the nominating phase, numerous pro-independence groups ran candidates for seats in the assembly often from the same district. Late in the spring, Ocampo announced his candidacy for Manila’s 2nd district, releasing a platform in June that the Manila Times, a newspaper sympathetic to American occupation, called “very safe, sane, and conservative.”14 Ocampo had become something of a realist over the years, and when he was approached about running for the assembly by calling for immediate independence, he flatly refused. American authorities would never grant it, and Ocampo did not want to waste time belaboring what he felt “constituted a deception of the people.” It made more political sense to him to work alongside American authorities and prepare gradually for a lasting freedom. Because Ocampo refused to support immediate independence, the Nacionalista ticket fractured and cost him a seat in the assembly.15
Nevertheless, Ocampo suddenly found himself on the inside track for a historic appointment to Congress. The same Philippine Organic Act of 1902 that created the assembly also empowered the islands’ legislature to elect two Resident Commissioners to the U.S. House of Representatives : the assembly and commission would each select one candidate who then had to be confirmed by the other chamber. In the fall of 1907, Ocampo’s name was submitted to the assembly, and on November 22, 1907, he was elected with 42 votes, more than double his closest competitor. The commission elected Benito Legarda, one of the Philippines’ wealthiest businessmen and a close ally of United States Secretary of War William H. Taft.16
Ocampo had a lot in his favor: even if he had mellowed a bit, he was committed to the cause of Philippine nationhood ; he ran a successful law practice; and he was well regarded among the islands’ ruling class. With Legarda, the commission had selected a member of the pro-American Progressive Party. But, with Ocampo, the assembly selected someone who it hoped could more ably represent the interests of its nationalist majority.17 As Blakeslee, the American foreign policy scholar, pointed out at the time, Ocampo was also a native Filipino. “The majority of the Assembly were anxious to have their delegate a true representative of their race,” Blakeslee observed. “This fact alone was enough to cause the defeat of other strong candidates who were in part of Spanish origin.”18
Ocampo’s politics and his long career in the public eye also seemed to make him the most viable compromise candidate. His service in the revolutionary government may have made him a radical, but by the time the assembly sent him to Washington, Ocampo had the reputation as a conservative leader among the Nacionalistas.19 The day after his election, an editorial in the Manila Times gave Ocampo a lukewarm endorsement, and mainland press accounts did so as well, describing the commission’s decision to confirm his nomination as “a good omen.” Ocampo, the New York Times surmised, was now the public face of the islands’ nationalist movement. “The career of Delegate Ocampo will be watched with interest,” the editors wrote.20
Secretary of War Taft might not have completely agreed with Ocampo’s politics, but the future commander in chief also held him in high regard, telling then President Theodore Roosevelt that the new Resident Commissioner was “a prominent and able member of the bar of the Islands and a man of high character.”21
The 60th Congress (1907–1909) was set to open on December 2, 1907, only 10 days after Ocampo’s election, severely condensing the new Resident Commissioner’s travel schedule. During the early 20th century, the trip from Manila to Washington, DC, took about a month and required travelers to set sail from Manila to Hong Kong in order to catch a steamer to San Francisco. So there was little hope Ocampo and Legarda would make it for the opening of the session. Congress, however, had a busy legislative agenda to start the 60th Congress, and the Bureau of Insular Affairs had told the Philippine commission that, in early January, the House would consider a major overhaul of the Dingley Tariff Act governing trade between the United States and the Philippines.22
Many people on the islands, especially in the Philippine legislature, were anxious for the Resident Commissioners to make it to Capitol Hill in time to participate in the tariff debate, but the quick turnaround from election to departure created a mess. After a series of schedule changes, Legarda and Ocampo agreed to leave Manila by December 21 in order to catch an America-bound ship sailing from southern China on Christmas Eve.23 “At all events,” one leading member of the Philippine legislature said, “it is important that they be in Washington at the time the bill is brought up in the House, so that it may have stout defenders in persons who are cognizant of all the facts in the case.”24
Adjusting tariff rates was complicated, detailed work that contained a number of competing interests in both the private and public sectors on either side of the Pacific. Neither Ocampo nor Legarda could claim to be tariff experts. So the legislature agreed to compile “all the necessary data” they would need to help shape the section of the legislation covering Philippine sugar and tobacco, the islands’ two major commodities.25
Ocampo and Legarda arrived in San Francisco on January 18, 1908, and almost immediately tried to sway public opinion to their side, telling the Associated Press that if Congress followed through on its plan to overhaul tariff rates prices back home would skyrocket.26
The Resident Commissioners made it to Washington two weeks later and took their seats in the House in early February 1908. On February 4, the House approved a measure giving them access to the House Floor and the right to participate in debate. They received suites in the new House Office Building (now the Cannon building), but were prohibited from voting or serving on committees.27 A few days later, the House did the “proper and handsome thing,” according to the New York Tribune, and voted to raise their salaries to match the rest of their House colleagues.28
Because they were the Philippines’ only voices on Capitol Hill, Legarda and Ocampo had to steer legislation in both chambers. Building working relationships with both Members and Senators was crucial to whatever success they were going to have. In mid-February, for instance, Legarda and Ocampo, whom the Baltimore Sun incorrectly referred to as “Bonito Legarda” and “Tablo Ocampo de Leon,” were formally introduced to the members of the Senate Committee on the Philippines.29
For Ocampo, establishing those relationships was likely going to be harder than normal. Unlike Legarda, Ocampo was not fluent in English and relied on his personal secretary, Antonio G. Escamilla, to translate for him. Escamilla and Ocampo likely knew one another from their time with the revolutionary government when they both served under General Aguinaldo.30 Not long after Ocampo took his seat in the House, it was reported that he planned on asking Speaker Joe Cannon of Illinois if Escamilla could join him on the House Floor during debate, but it is not clear if this meeting ever occurred. Ocampo also hoped to have Legarda translate for him.31
Ocampo kept a relatively low profile during his first term in the House, but something as simple as his presence on the floor, especially when he sat and spoke with the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico and the Delegate from Hawaii, generated interest in the galleries above.32 In an official capacity, however, Ocampo mostly stayed behind the scenes. Evidence in the Congressional Record suggests that Ocampo pigeonholed Members in the chamber to discuss living conditions back home and other issues affecting the Philippines.33
In late February 1908, Ocampo and Legarda accompanied Secretary Taft during his testimony before the House Insular Affairs Committee and nodded along in support as Taft asked the committee to raise the number of seats on the Philippine commission from eight to nine.34 When the commission bill went to the floor two months later, Ocampo did not participate in debate, but Members pointed out that both he and Legarda favored the expansion.35 Ultimately, the bill (H.R. 17516) passed the House and became law a few months later.
During his first term in the House, Ocampo juggled two often interrelated responsibilities, one as the Philippines’ official representative before the federal legislature and another as a booster for his homeland. At least twice in his first year he traveled outside Washington to address crowds and participate in conferences. In mid-March, Ocampo, Legarda, and officials from the Bureau of Insular Affairs went to Cincinnati, Ohio—Taft’s hometown—to attend an annual dinner hosted by the Cincinnati Commercial Club. Ocampo, speaking through a translator, touted the Philippines’ natural resources and delivered remarks meant to entice American businesses to the Pacific.36 Later in the year, in October, Ocampo traveled to Lake Mohonk, New York, for a conference titled simply “The Philippines,” where he told the crowd that Filipinos across the island chain shared in “the vivid desire of being free and independent.”37
A stable and lasting independence, however, required a healthy economy. Ever since the war, the Philippines had worked to build an infrastructure and a robust commercial sector. In large measure, however, the future of the islands’ economy would be dictated by its trade relationship with the United States, and that trade relationship fell squarely within Congress’s purview.
At the time, the United States had no income tax, which meant the government generated much of its revenue from fees placed on goods imported to America. Trade with the Philippines became problematic, however, because of its territorial status. On the one hand, the Philippines, as an American territory, could be seen as a domestic trading partner. On the other hand, many people on either side of the Pacific saw the Philippines as a separate country entirely. The question on everyone’s mind was whether that unique status made the Philippines a foreign commercial entity.38
Before tackling tariff rates in 1909, Ocampo went before the House Insular Affairs Committee to address a completely separate concern the Philippine legislature had regarding the qualifications needed to serve in the islands’ assembly. Manila wanted Congress to amend the Organic Act of 1902 so that the requirements to serve at the local level matched those for service in the insular government. The changes the Philippines wanted were modest but would have made service in the assembly slightly more difficult, raising the age limit from 25 to 26, tightening district residency regulations, and instituting a literacy test in “English or Spanish or any of the local dialects.” The hearing lasted only a few minutes, and with his secretary Antonio Escamilla translating, Ocampo answered a series of questions on the electoral process back home.39 The Insular Affairs Committee supported the bill, which came straight from the Philippine legislature, but with only two weeks left in the session, the full House appears to have taken a pass.40 It would be another two years before Congress took a close look at the Philippines’ civil government, and, at that point, Ocampo had already left the House.41
When the 61st Congress (1909–1911) opened on March 4, 1909, tariff reforms dominated everything. It was a monumental legislative task, and the Ways and Means Committee and its chairman, Sereno Payne, had spent much of the last term gathering research. The newly elected President Taft also threw the weight of his administration behind the reform effort. By 1909, however, the United States faced a budget shortfall of nearly $100 million, which put a substantial amount of pressure on Congress to set sustainable rates in order to cover the country’s operating costs. As part of the debate, Congress was forced to consider options for the major industries in the Philippines : sugar and tobacco.42
Free trade with the Philippines had long been an ambition on Capitol Hill, but implementing it had proven difficult. Among other issues, U.S. sugar and tobacco interests had waged campaign after campaign to protect their market share and keep Philippine products out of the country while simultaneously insisting on direct and unfettered access to consumers in the Philippines.43
From the Philippines’ perspective, free trade threatened economic collapse. Like Washington, the government in Manila filled its treasury with money derived in large measure from fees on imports. Recognizing Congress’s ambition for free trade, however, the islands’ legislature instituted a direct tax on its people in an effort to compensate for what would amount to a huge loss of annual revenue if and when free trade went into effect. Despite the foresight of the Philippines’ legislature, by 1909, free trade had yet to begin, leaving the government in Manila with two sources of income : tariffs and taxes. Using tariffs to fund the government, the Philippines started a series of ambitious infrastructure projects to pump its tax revenue back into the economy. To suddenly implement free trade would risk that progress.44
By the spring of 1909, the House’s solution to the Philippine tariff issue seemed woefully one sided. H.R. 1438, the tariff bill which would eventually become the Payne–Aldrich law, created what one member of the press called “a novel free trade system.” The proposal gave American businesses unlimited access to the Philippines, but used quotas to restrict the entry of Philippine goods into America. It was free only in the sense that America could export its merchandise to the Philippines with no charge. There was no vice versa.45
On April 2, 1909, as the House was midway through its consideration of the tariff bill, Ocampo became the first Filipino to formally participate in debate. Speaking in halting English, he forcefully criticized the bill’s treatment of his native Philippines. “The lack of absolute reciprocity in that provision of the bill,” he said, “makes it inequitable, inasmuch as the Philippine Islands, considered a poor and small country, are under the protection of the United States, a gigantic Nation and a herald of wealth.” As designed, the new U.S.–Philippine trade relationship would cost the Pacific territory vast sums every year. Compounding the problem, America’s easy access to Filipino consumers would deter international competition. “Once foreign goods are driven from the Philippine markets,” Ocampo continued, “the importer of American products would control the situation, and, following the usual practice in trade as seen in the past and in the present, he will despotically dictate the prices to the detriment of the consuming public who shall be enslaved even in their most pressing needs.”46
But the stakes involved in the tariff bill were not all financial, and Ocampo pivoted to another topic : the Philippines’ future independence. In an ideal world, independence would allow the Philippines to impose tariffs on U.S. goods down the road if it wanted. But in Ocampo’s assessment of H.R. 1438, he saw the Philippines struggling with its hoped-for freedom. He predicted that if the bill became law, the relaxed trade terms would embolden U.S. companies to move to the Philippines. Once American companies took root in the Philippines, Ocampo expected them to use their influence to halt the movement to give the territory its independence. He was not alone in this fear. Both the assembly and the Philippine commission, where Americans wielded considerable power, opposed free trade between the United States and the Philippines.47
Ocampo concluded his address by challenging the House to vote down the free trade provision in Payne–Aldrich, proving to the world that it was not merely trying to exploit the Philippines. Only after the Philippines won its independence would free trade “be more advantageous to both countries,” he said before closing with one last ultimatum. If Congress really wanted to open free trade with the Pacific, it should first vote to free the islands. “In this way the American people will sanctify the noble work of liberating the Philippines as it liberated Cuba and other countries.” Ocampo’s remarks earned him a round of applause.48
A few weeks later he doubled down. “This free-trade proposition is a case of life and death with us,” he told the press. “The ambition of the Filipinos to live an independent life is one which is undeniable and persistent, and any measure tending to oppose it would only stir the people of the islands and operate to prevent the development of a better feeling between Americans and Filipinos.” Reaching back two centuries, Ocampo contrasted America’s past against Congress’s reluctance. “Surely in the land of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams it can be permitted us to express the wish that we may be allowed to govern ourselves. It ought to be understood that in the centuries of protest against the rule of Spain we were not merely trying to throw off one foreign yoke to go under another.”49
Despite Ocampo’s strong words, Congress approved the unique tariff schedule that gave U.S. businesses virtually unlimited access to Philippine markets. Payne–Aldrich became law on August 5, 1909. But in an effort to help soften the blow to the islands’ economy, President Taft, the Insular Bureau, and Resident Commissioner Legarda crafted a separate bill (H.R. 9135) adjusting certain rates to generate revenue for the Philippines.50 It, too, became law in early August, but it is unclear what role Ocampo had in its passage. In fact, by the time the House voted on the revenue bill’s final passage, Ocampo was already a lameduck Resident Commissioner.51
A few months earlier, in mid-May, Manuel L. Quezon, a leader in the Philippine assembly and a member of the Partido Nacionalista, was elected to replace Ocampo in Washington.52 Cabling Ocampo the day of Quezon’s confirmation, Sergio Osmeña, the assembly’s speaker, expressed his regret at having to break the bad news. He wished Ocampo a safe trip home and thanked him for his “brilliant work” on Capitol Hill.53 There were conflicting reports about whether Ocampo was shocked and disappointed by his loss, but, regardless, the Manila Times reported that political forces beyond his control dictated the outcome. A likely theory had it that the Progresistas, confident they could flip Quezon’s seat in the assembly if he was in Washington, threw him their votes just to get him out of Manila.54 Ocampo, accompanied by his secretary Antonio Escamilla, left DC for San Francisco on August 11, 1909. He planned to set sail home for the final time as Resident Commissioner six days later.55
After returning to Manila, Ocampo won election to the second Philippine legislature and served in the assembly starting in October 1910, continuing his push for Philippine nationhood. He died of pneumonia on February 5, 1925.56
1Congressional Record, House, 60th Cong., 1st sess. (2 May 1908): 5609.
2G. H. Blakeslee, “The Gentlemen from Manila,” 18 January 1908, Harper’s Weekly: 14.
3“Pablo Ocampo,” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–Present, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay. pl?index=O000020.
4Blakeslee, “The Gentlemen from Manila”; Thomas F. Millard, “The First Filipino Delegates to Washington,” 2 February 1908, New York Times Magazine: 9; Frank H. Golay, Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898–1946 (Madison: University of Wisconsin- Madison Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998): 32.
5“Civil Rule for the Philippines,” 21 August 1900, New York Times: 6.
6Blakeslee, “The Gentlemen from Manila”; Millard, “The First Filipino Delegates to Washington.”
7“Filipino Rebels Who Will Go Free,” 1 July 1902, Los Angeles Times: 4.
8“Bribery Used on Insurgents,” 8 March 1901, Atlanta Constitution: 3; Special Report of William H. Taft, Secretary of War, to the President on the Philippines, 60th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 200 (1908): 46; Blakeslee, “The Gentlemen from Manila.” For more on Blakeslee as a scholar and foreign policy specialist, see http://www.clarku.edu/ research/archives/blakeslee/scope.cfm (accessed 23 February 2016), and “George Blakeslee, Educator, U.S. Aide,” 6 May 1954, New York Times: 33.
9“Filipino Rebels Who Will Go Free”; “Two Filipinos To Congress,” 23 November 1907, Chicago Daily Tribune: 5.
10Millard, “The First Filipino Delegates to Washington.”
11Michael Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908 (Manila, PI: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003): 128–129.
12Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics: 286–294; Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974): 128.
13Julius W. Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave away a Colonial Empire (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950): 199. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 went into effect as Public Law 57-235, 32 Stat. 691 (1902).
14As quoted in Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics: 306.
15“The Official Count of the Vote Total In Manila,” 31 July 1907, Manila Times: 1; Millard, “The First Filipino Delegates to Washington.”
16“Legarda and Ocampo Are Chosen,” 22 November 1907, Manila Times: 1; Journal of the Philippine Commission, Inaugural Session, vol. 1 (Manila Bureau of Printing, 1908): 94, https://www.hathitrust.org (accessed 18 February 2016).
17Millard, “The First Filipino Delegates to Washington.”
18Blakeslee, “The Gentlemen from Manila.”
19“Filipino Rebels Who Will Go Free”; Blakeslee, “The Gentlemen from Manila.”
20“The Selection of Ocampo,” 23 November 1907, Manila Times: 4; “A Radical Filipino Delegate,” 24 November 1907, New York Times: 8.
21Special Report of William H. Taft, Secretary of War, to the President on the Philippines: 46.
22Journal of the Philippine Commission, Inaugural Session, vol. 1: 115, 120, 362–363.
23Ibid., 115, 120, 358–361, 369–370.
24Ibid., 362.
25Ibid., 361.
26“Filipinos Fear Japan’s Plans,” 20 January 1908, Los Angeles Times: I2.
27Congressional Record, House, 60th Cong., 1st sess. (4 February 1908): 1540; “Commissioners from Philippines to Sixtieth Congress,” 13 February 1908, Los Angeles Times: I2.
28No title, 8 February 1908, New York Tribune: 6.
29“Briefs from Washington,” 18 February 1908, Baltimore Sun: 2.
30“People Met in Hotel Lobbies,” 28 January 1908, Washington Post: 6; David R. Francis, The Universal Exposition of 1904 (Louisiana Purchase Exposition Company, 1913): 566, http://books.google.com (accessed 19 February 2016); John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999): 58; Murat Halstead, The Story of the Philippines and Our New Possessions, Including the Ladrones, Hawaii, Cuba and Porto Rico (Chicago, IL: Our Possessions Publishing Company, 1898): 61, https://archive.org/ (accessed 19 February 2016); “All Eyes on New York,” 16 August 1908, New York Tribune: 1; “Wright Helped Out by Taft,” 16 August 1908, Chicago Daily Tribune: 7.
31“Needs Interpreter in Congress,” 6 February 1908, New York Tribune: 7.
32“House Scene Recalls Champ Clark’s Vision,” 28 February 1908, Detroit Free Press: 2; “Legislative Briefs,” 28 February 1908, Washington Post: 4.
33Congressional Record, House, 60th Cong., 1st sess. (1 April 1908): 4245.
34Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Increase Membership of Philippine Commission, 60th Cong., 1st sess. (20 February 1908): 4.
35Congressional Record, House, 60th Cong., 1st sess. (2 May 1908): 5607–5609.
36“Filipinos Urge Trade,” 14 March 1908, Washington Post: 3; “Speaking Against Tariff,” 17 March 1908, Cablenews-American (Manila, PI): 1; “Delegates Banquetted,” 17 March 1908, Manila Times: 1.
37“Philippines Under Debate,” 23 October 1908, Los Angeles Times: I2.
38Thomas F. Millard, “Philippines Not a ‘Problem’ Nor a ‘Burden,’” 23 February 1908, New York Times Magazine: 2; Thomas F. Millard, “Our Interests and Our Duty in the Philippine Islands,” 23 February 1908, Washington Post Magazine: 4; Thomas F. Millard, “Congress Holds the Key,” 23 February 1908, Chicago Daily Tribune: A1.
39Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Qualifications for Electors in the Philippine Legislature, 60th Cong., 2nd sess. (17 February 1909): 1–2.
40House Committee on Insular Affairs, Qualifications for Electors in the Philippine Islands, 60th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Rept. 2184 (15 February 1909).
41Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, H.R. 32004, 61st Cong., 3rd sess. (26 January 1911); Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, S. 7400, Administration of Civil Government in Philippine Islands, Part 2, 61st Cong., 3rd sess. (26 January 1911).
42Lewis L. Gould, The William Howard Taft Presidency (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009): 51–57.
43Pedro E. Abelarde, American Tariff Policy toward The Philippines, 1898–1946 (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1947): 76–77.
44Congressional Record, House, 61st Cong., 1st sess. (2 April 1909): 818; Congressional Record, House, 61st Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 1909): 929–930.
45“Congress Hears Filipino Attack Tariff,” 2 April 1909, Christian Science Monitor: 1.
46Congressional Record, House, 61st Cong., 1st sess. (2 April 1909): 818. For research purposes, the Congressional Record is inconsistent in how it identifies Ocampo. At one point he’s referred to as “Mr. de Leon” and at others as “Mr. Ocampo.”
47Congressional Record, House, 61st Cong., 1st sess. (2 April 1909): 819.
48Ibid.
49Congressional Record, Senate, 61st Cong., 1st sess. (21 May 1909): 2240.
50Abelarde, American Tariff Policy toward The Philippines: 100.
51Congressional Record, House, 61st Cong., 1st sess. (24 May 1909): 2238.
52The election was lopsided: Quezon received 61 votes, Ocampo received four, and two other candidates received one vote each. “Legarda and Quezon Chosen,” 15 May 1909, Manila Times: 1.
53“Ocampo Not Puzzled,” 20 May 1909, Washington Post: 12.
54Ibid.; “Ocampo Much Disappointed,” 22 May 1909, Manila Times: 1; Journal of the Philippine Commission, Second Session of the First Philippine Legislature, vol. 3 (Manila Bureau of Printing, 1908): 502–504, www.hathitrust.org (accessed 22 February 2016).
55No title, 12 August 1909, Washington Post: 7.
56“Ocampo Funeral Set for Saturday,” 6 February 1925, Manila Times: 1; “Pablo Ocampo Dead,” 7 February 1925, New York Times: 15.
View Record in the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress
[ Top ]Martin, Mart. The Almanac of Women and Minorities in American Politics. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999.
"Pablo Ocampo" in Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in Congress, 1900-2017. Prepared under the direction of the Committee on House Administration by the Office of the Historian and the Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington: Government Publishing Office, 2018.
