Joseph Hernández, the first Hispanic Member of
Congress and the first Territorial Delegate to represent
Florida, bridged his state’s cultural and governmental
transition from Spanish colony to U.S. territory. Hernández
fought first for Spain and later for the United States; he
also earned—and lost—a fortune that included three
plantations and numerous slaves. His complex life and
career as a slave-owning, Indian-fighting politician cut
from Jacksonian cloth embodied conflicting attitudes
toward statehood, representation, and territorial conquest.
Though brief, his service to the territory set an effective
precedent, prompting the Washington City Gazette to
declare, a “compliment is due to the zeal and industry
of the honourable delegate from Florida, who during
the session, appeared at all times attentive to the objects
connected with the prosperity of his constituents and the
interests of the Territory.”1
José Mariano Hernández was born on May 26, 1788,
in St. Augustine, Spanish Florida. He was the third of 10
children and the first son of Martín Hernández, Jr., and
Dorotea Gomila, immigrants from the island of Minorca.
The Hernándezes settled in St. Augustine in 1784, living
in the northern section of the city, dubbed the Minorcan
Quarter. Local residents earned their livelihoods by
farming, fishing, and making handcrafts. Although the
Hernándezes were not among St. Augustine’s elite families,
Martín Hernández was a skilled laborer and a slave
owner, indicating that the family had some wealth. José
Hernández attended local schools run by Catholic priests
and worked with his father in carpentry. As an adolescent,
he was educated in Savannah, Georgia, and Havana, Cuba.
He returned to East Florida in 1811 after studying law,
most likely in Cuba.2
During the Second Spanish Period (1783–1821), Spain
regained territory lost to the British in the Seven Years’
War (1756–1763). At that time, the Florida peninsula
was divided between East and West Florida.3 One
historian describes Spanish East Florida as a “province
virtually devoid of people, a place rich in land but poor
in inhabitants.” By 1811 the population numbered barely
4,000. St. Augustine and Fernandina, both coastal ports,
were its only urban centers. The remainder of East Florida
was “a scattering of forts, cotton and rice plantations,
citrus groves, farms, cattle-ranching operations, sawmills,
and lumber camps.” Many of the colonial properties were
nestled along the St. Marys, Nassau, and St. Johns Rivers.
The area’s major landmarks were military installations
that guarded important routes on the rivers. East Florida
society was a “small, somewhat self-contained world, one
in which Spanish officials had to carefully balance Crown
prerogatives against local needs and … defend Spanish
interests with limited resources. Political life revolved
entirely around the governor in his dealings with various
factions of settlers.” As a result of East Florida’s physical
isolation, small tax base, and limited funding from the
Spanish government, local officials sought regional trade
opportunities. In the 1790s, East Florida increased its
trade with neighbors such as Mexico, Cuba, and the
United States. However, territorial ambitions, economic
competition, and distinct cultural differences between
East Florida and its northern neighbors in Georgia and
the Mississippi Territory poisoned their relations and
plunged the region into armed conflict. In 1790 the king
of Spain spurred increased settlement—and possible
conflicts—by offering homestead grants to U.S. citizens.
A variety of factors stirred tensions between the settlers
in Georgia and those in Florida. Economic competition
played a major role. Both groups of settlers jockeyed for
influence with the Florida Indians, who controlled
lucrative trade markets and were potentially a significant
force in an armed conflict. Also, much of the commerce in
the Southern United States was based on access to rivers,
many of which emptied into the Gulf of Mexico through
the Floridas. Furthermore, control of the Floridas was
a security issue because foreign powers could encroach
into the Deep South by using the Florida route. Cultural
conflicts deriving from differences in religious background
(U.S. Protestants vs. Spanish Catholics) and great-power
alliance (Spain was an ally of Great Britain, and memories
of the American Revolution were still fresh) further
divided the two groups. But their attitudes toward slavery
drove the largest wedge between them. First, many of the
conflicts regarding slavery developed from the differences
between the black-white framework of Anglo-American
jurisprudence and the more permeable three-race structure
of Hispanic societies. Second, U.S. slaveholders were aware
that Florida was a close haven for fugitive slaves, who could
blend into Spanish or Seminole communities with relative
ease. Third, the use of armed black soldiers in the Florida
militia alarmed U.S. slaveholders, who feared possible slave
revolts. Underlying all this was the lack of a clear governing
authority, which encouraged violent acts of retribution.
After 1790, neither the U.S. nor the Spanish authorities
could effectively control border conflicts.4
For the next two decades, U.S. encroachment into
East Florida, though sporadic, was sanctioned by two
presidential administrations. President Thomas Jefferson
and his Secretary of State, James Madison, sought to
expand U.S. territory to the south and west of the original
13 colonies. Both men particularly coveted the Louisiana
territory and the Floridas. After the Louisiana Purchase in
1803, Jefferson and Madison pressured Spain to cede the
Floridas through a combination of economic inducement,
military force, and slow advancement by U.S. settlers.5
The outbreak of what is known as the Patriot War
developed out of U.S. settlers’ resentment toward the
Spanish government and their wanton desire to annex
the territory for the United States. In March 1812, a
group of self-proclaimed “Patriots” led by U.S. general
George Mathews occupied the town of Fernandina and
laid siege to St. Augustine. They declared victory in July
1812. The Madison administration supported the Patriots
as a low-risk effort to foment instability in East Florida
that could be used as a pretext for seizing new land and
stopping British incursion into the region. However,
when President Madison later withdrew his support, the
initiative became a bloody, destructive war that lasted
two more years. After returning to Florida, Hernández
volunteered to join the Spanish military to defend the
territory against U.S. expansionists.6
In February 1814, Hernández married Ana Hill
Williams, a wealthy widow who lived in St. Augustine.
Ana had at least nine children from her first marriage,
including Guillermo, José Mariano Tomas, Eliza Ana, José
Sam Gil, Juan Theofilio, Ana Teresa, Martín, Dorotea, and
Louisa. Ana owned properties—among them, a 3,200-acre
sugar cane plantation called Orange Grove—that allowed
Hernández to become a prominent planter. Hernández
also acquired a number of profitable land grants during the
Patriot War.
In 1817 the First Seminole War erupted in the West
Florida province. In January 1818 Andrew Jackson led a
force of 4,800 men into the Spanish Floridas, seizing a fort
and destroying Seminole settlements along the way. The
campaign concluded in May 1818 with the formal cession
of West Florida to the United States. Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams and Spanish Ambassador Luis de
Onís negotiated and signed a treaty of cession on February
22, 1819. After two years of diplomatic wrangling,
the treaty was approved by the Senate on February 22,
1821. Although Hernández’s role in the war remains
ambiguous, it is clear that he benefited from the conflict by
receiving more land grants from the Spanish government.7
Ultimately, with the land that he purchased or inherited
by marriage and the massive holdings he received as service
grants from the Spanish crown, Hernández controlled
25,670 acres at the time of the U.S. annexation.8
Rather than fleeing with other Spanish settlers to Cuba,
Mexico, or Texas, Hernández chose to stay and work with
the new regime, changing his name from José Mariano
to Joseph Marion. Hernández became friendly with the
territory’s first civil governor, William Pope DuVal, a
Jeffersonian Republican, a former Representative from
Kentucky, and an ally of Andrew Jackson’s. In April of
1822, DuVal submitted the names of Hernández and
seven others as delegates to Florida’s first legislative council.
Hernández was also nominated to the brigadier generalship
of the East Florida militia. The Florida legislative council
selected Hernández to serve as Territorial Delegate, a
decision that was confirmed by a three-day election
(September 30 to October 2, 1822) in which Hernández
faced no opposition.9
Hernández was sworn into the House on January
3, 1823.10 As a Hispanic Catholic Representative in a
Congress that was predominantly Anglo-American and
Protestant, Hernández was entering uncharted territory.
But Hernández was well qualified to usher in Florida’s
transition from Spanish to U.S. rule: He was bilingual,
an established planter, and a well-known soldier who
had fought in two major wars that determined Florida’s
territorial status. However, his legislative role was
circumscribed, largely because of institutional restrictions
on the powers of a Territorial Delegate. At the time,
Territorial Delegates were prohibited from serving on
standing House committees; thus, Hernández did not hold
a committee assignment during his brief tenure.11
During Hernández’s time in Congress, the finalization
of Florida annexation by the United States involved two
controversial issues, access to owning land or validating
land deeds and the removal of Seminoles from the
territory.12 These overarching priorities shaped Hernández’s
four-pronged legislative agenda as Delegate: verifying the
status of land grants as a result of their transition from
Spanish to Anglo-American jurisprudence; advocating for
infrastructural improvements; assisting Florida with its
recovery from recent wars; and fostering relations among
U.S. settlers and the remaining Spanish elites, Indians, and
territorial authorities.
Hernández’s first objective was to facilitate the
verification of land claims from the Spanish government
to the U.S. government. This was a personal issue as much
as a diplomatic matter, given his extensive land holdings.
On January 20, 1823, Hernández submitted a bill asking
the House Committee on Public Lands to award “public
lots and houses within the city of Pensacola” to the city
instead of to the U.S. government. The next day, in a letter
to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Hernández
noted, “[It] is to be regreted Sir, that in a Territory so
recently obtained from a forign Nation, whose Inhabitants
are yet unacquainted with the System & Laws of Our
Government, Should have had instances of … open
Controvercy between its public functionaries” regarding
these land claims. Hernández included a memorial from
the St. Augustine city council and his own resolution.
He asked Adams to “lay the enclosed papers before the
President [Monroe], in order … to prevent … interference
with the said property” until Congress rendered a decision.13
On February 17, upon hearing that the Senate would reject
the bill, Hernández appealed to Vice President Daniel
D. Tompkins of New York to submit a bill creating an
additional board of commissioners to settle the land claims.14
On behalf of the residents of St. Augustine, Hernández
submitted a petition that lobbied for the separation of East
and West Florida, outlining a plan for “a separate board of
commissioners … to ascertain titles and claims to land” in
East Florida and to permit settlement on public land.15 The
petition also requested that the “aid of Congress may be
extended” toward building and maintaining transportation
infrastructure and asked Congress to prohibit U.S. soldiers
from voting for Territorial Delegates. The House sent the
petition to five committees, each of which had jurisdiction
over specific complaints.16 Hernández also submitted a
petition that called for a revision to the “assessment of taxes
and the establishment of county courts.”17 In February
1823, Hernández objected to a bill that proposed forming
a single board of commissioners; he argued that two boards
were required because the dispensation of land grants in
East Florida differed from that in West Florida. A new law
(3 Stat. 754–756) resolved the issues regarding land claims
and the formation of a board of commissioners described
by Hernández in his legislation.18
Federal support for capital improvement projects
such as roads, bridges, and canals was another priority.
Hernández sought the construction of a 380-mile road
between St. Augustine and Pensacola, Florida’s two
largest settlements. A contemporary observed, “The best
practicable track is about seven hundred miles, through
an unsettled and savage wilderness, which is travelled with
great hazard and difficulty.”19 Hernández also lobbied for
new roads south of St. Augustine to facilitate the economic
development of East Florida. In February 1823, Hernández
submitted H.R. 275, which called for congressional
funding for these routes, noting in a memorandum that a
portion of the Pensacola–St. Augustine road “was originally
opened by the British Government” during its occupation
of the Floridas. After consideration by the Committee on
Public Lands, a bill appropriating $15,000 for the project
was passed by the House. On March 1, the bill was taken
up by the Senate, where it was ordered to lie on the table
but was not acted upon before the 17th Congress closed
on March 3.20 Hernández did not give up. In a March 11,
1823, letter to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun of South
Carolina, Hernández insisted that a major roadway would
benefit the military and the territorial government. He also
believed it would facilitate the construction of a capital city
and make Florida an attractive candidate for statehood.21
Hernández was a diplomatist as well as a legislator,
promoting resolutions to conflicts with American Indians
and seeking to smooth the transition from Spanish to
U.S. rule. In the first decades of the 19th century,
relations between Anglos and Indians often involved the
imposition of racial separation. Although Hernández had
interacted with Indians during his youth and adulthood, he
conformed to the separatist practices of U.S. settlers.
He encouraged the James Monroe administration to
negotiate a treaty that would gather the Seminoles in
one location and outline their relationship with the U.S.
government. The resultant Treaty of Moultrie Creek,
ratified in December 1823, compelled all Indians in
Florida to move to a four-million-acre reservation with
defined boundaries.22
When Hernández’s term ended in March 1823, he
prepared to run for a second term. A local newspaper
endorsed his candidacy, stating, “In the faithful execution
of the various and important trusts committed to him …
his good sense and information on every subject connected
with the interests and prosperity of this territory have
inspired confidence and esteem in the Administration …
and gained for Florida many warm and valuable friends
on the floor of Congress.”23 Three opponents challenged
the incumbent in the June 1823 election: Alexander
Hamilton of St. Augustine and Farquar Bethune of
Fernandina, both from East Florida; and Richard Keith
Call, a Jackson acolyte who served on the territorial
legislative council, from West Florida. According to one
scholar, “Politics in Florida were largely of a personal
nature as certain men of wealth and education became the
natural leaders of political life on the frontier.” In sum,
voters were predisposed to support political candidates
because of regional ties rather than party loyalties.24
The candidates from East Florida split the vote three
ways: Hernández garnered 252 votes to Hamilton’s 249
and Bethune’s 36. Call ran unopposed in West Florida,
capitalizing on his service as the region’s brigadier general
of the militia, and with 496 votes he won a seat in the
18th Congress (1823–1825). Hernández’s political career
shifted to territorial politics with his appointment by
President James Monroe to the territorial legislative
council at the suggestion of Territorial Delegate Call.
President John Quincy Adams renewed Hernández’s
appointment in 1825.25
Hernández ran for Delegate in 1825 against Joseph M. White, a Kentucky lawyer and politician who lived
in Pensacola, and James Gadsden, a territorial council
member who would eventually become known for
negotiating the purchase of a portion of southern Arizona
and New Mexico in 1853.26 A laudatory editorial in the
East Florida Herald reminded readers of Hernández’s
service in the House. Describing Hernández’s efforts to
secure passage of H.R. 275 and his facilitation of the
Treaty of Moultrie Creek, the editor wrote, “We cannot
but admit, that if talent or zeal deserve reward; if useful
services call for some gratitude and acknowledgement …
the claims of Gen. Hernández are paramount to those
of every other candidate.”27 A rebuttal stressed White’s
superior qualifications and suggested that having a
Hispanic Delegate would be a liability for Florida. While
no one would deny Hernández credit for his previous
service, the writer argued, White was “better acquainted
with our language, the organization of our political
institutions, and the mode of transacting business in the
councils of the nation.” Hernández was almost left off the
ballot. Announcing his candidacy in a public letter to local
electors, he wrote that hearing rumors “I had withdrawn
my name; I deem it a duty, that I owe to the public and
my friends … to put an end to any uncertainty, that may
prevail on this subject.”28 In the general election, White
prevailed with 742 votes, Gadsden placed second with 460
votes, and Hernández trailed with 362 votes.29
During the 1820s, Hernández established himself as
a major territorial planter, producing some of Florida’s
biggest cash crops, including sugar cane and cotton.
Contemporary publications noted the outstanding
productivity of the Mala Compra and St. Joseph
Plantations. However, Hernández’s sugar cane and cotton
crops required him to use between 60 and 150 slaves to
run three massive plantations. Despite his agricultural
success, Hernández was forced to sell large tracts of land
during the mid-1820s to retire debts and make mortgage
payments. In 1835 he borrowed money and used his
estates as collateral to remain solvent.30
By this time, relations between white settlers and the
Seminoles had deteriorated almost to the point of open
conflict. Territorial authorities believed Indian removal
policies that had been adopted in other parts of the
Southeast would also work for Florida, and white settlers
wanted to permanently eliminate Indian enclaves for
fugitive slaves. Like other slave owners, Hernández was
concerned about havens for fugitive slaves and about the
possibility of armed rebellion by escaped slaves and the
Seminoles. In response to the unrest, President Andrew
Jackson sent a 700-man regular army force to coordinate
the defense of East Florida. By late December 1835,
black and Seminole insurgents had destroyed a half-dozen
plantations in the St. Augustine area. A number of other
devastating attacks in the region signaled the start of the
Second Seminole War.31
Hernández returned to the battlefield in the Second
Seminole War (1835–1842). According to his most recent
biographer, he “was incredibly influential in shaping the
course of … the conflict” as the senior commander of the
East Florida militia. He was responsible for ensuring the
safety of civilians in East Florida and for protecting its
complex of plantations, including his own. Hernández
managed the defenses of the region with limited manpower
in a territory that covered all of modern-day Florida except
the Panhandle. Hernández contended with the militia,
which was reluctant to fight away from home and with
recalcitrant army regulars, who refused to follow his orders.
After the arrival of reinforcements in March 1836 and a
new field commander, Hernández played a significant role
in the conflict, but was not the senior field commander.
Throughout 1836, he helped recover slaves and prevented
them from fleeing toward enemy lines.32
The war brought Hernández financial and political
misfortune. In early 1836, the Seminoles attacked
and destroyed 16 plantations in East Florida, among
them Hernández’s St. Joseph sugar cane operation.
Compounding this loss, the U.S. Army requisitioned
the Mala Compra Plantation. Mala Compra’s use as a
hospital, field headquarters, and supply depot, along with
its abuse by soldiers, all but destroyed Hernández’s home.
Moreover, his workforce was greatly diminished. The war
also brought Hernández unwanted national recognition.
An informer led Hernández, two mounted companies of
militia, and three companies of regular troops to a secluded
camp of escaped slaves and Seminoles. Hernández’s
group captured dozens of enemy combatants, including
a prominent leader who had organized the destruction
of Hernández’s St. Joseph plantation. In October 1837
he facilitated a meeting between U.S. forces and a group
of prominent Seminole leaders that included Osceola.33
Osceola’s party arrived under a flag of truce but with no
indication that they were willing to surrender. However,
Hernández’s commander, General Thomas Sidney Jesup,
ordered Hernández to capture the men. Following orders,
Hernández’s 250-soldier contingent captured Osceola and
79 Seminoles. Within Florida, Hernández and Jesup were
hailed as heroes, but nationally, Jesup’s decision to ignore
the truce was criticized by the press. Although Hernández
escaped censure, his association with the incident tarnished
his political prospects. For the remainder of 1837,
Hernández participated in expeditionary campaigns against
Seminole insurgents in central and South Florida. In
January 1838, he asked to be relieved from duty because
of the war’s toll on his personal fortunes. The Seminole
War dragged on for four more years.34
Hernández attempted to revive his political career by
running for the U.S. Senate. In the early 1840s, as Florida
became more partisan with the Whig-Democrat divide,
Hernández joined the Nucleus, a faction of conservative
elites drawn from the ranks of planters, businessmen, and
merchants. Like his counterparts, Hernández opposed
single statehood for Florida; instead, he advocated for two
states, East Florida and West Florida. His main competitor
was David Levy, a Whig who tirelessly promoted the one-state
concept. In July 1845, several months after Florida
was admitted to the Union, Hernández, Levy, James
D. Westcott, and Jackson Morton ran for Florida’s two
U.S. Senate seats. A majority of the Florida senate chose
Levy and Westcott, who won handily with 41 votes each;
Hernández and Morton received 16 votes each.35
Though his dreams of national office had ended,
Hernández remained active in local politics, serving as
mayor of St. Augustine in 1848. He eventually left Florida
to reside in Matanzas, Cuba, in his later years and died on
June 8, 1857.36
View Record in the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress
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