The longest serving Resident Commissioner
from the Philippines and a protégé of Manuel
L. Quezon, Pedro Guevara waged a difficult
battle promoting Philippine independence while fighting
congressional measures to curb territorial sovereignty and
economic progress. Guevara acted for much of his career
as the voice of the Philippine legislature in Congress in a
low-key style of delivery that relied on prepared statements
rather than fiery, impromptu speeches. Guevara began his
career a stalwart proponent of independence, saying, “For
25 years I and my people have lived under the American
flag. Yet wherever I go Americans take me for … some
other Oriental. Americans know very little about us or
our country, and they care even less than they know.
To continue American control, under such conditions,
is an injustice to the Filipinos.”1 But his perspective
shifted in his final years as Resident Commissioner, and
disagreements with his patron Quezon over the best path
to independence led to his quiet retirement from politics.
Pedro Guevara was born on February 23, 1879, in
Santa Cruz, Laguna Province, Luzon, Philippines. The
son of Miguel Guevara and Maria G. Valenzuela, he
attended local schools some 60 miles to the south of
Manila. Guevara’s family sent him north to the capital to
attend a finishing school, Ateneo Municipal de Manila,
and then Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Guevara earned
a liberal arts degree at the latter school in 1896, finishing
at the head of his class. When the 1896 revolution broke
out, Guevara fought the Spanish and earned the rank of
lieutenant colonel for his service, including helping to lead
Filipino forces in the Battle of Mabitac. In the Philippine-American War, he joined the insurrectionaries who
opposed U.S. occupation forces, serving as aide and private
secretary to General Juan Cailles, commander of Philippine
rebels in Laguna Province. After the war ended, Guevara joined the Philippine constabulary, a paramilitary unit
that maintained peace. After five years of service, Guevara
returned to civilian life and, in a pattern reminiscent of
others who later became Resident Commissioners, worked
as a journalist. He became chief editor of Soberanía
Nacional (National Sovereignty), a newspaper that
championed Philippine independence, and also served as
city editor for four other newspapers. During this time,
Guevara studied at La Jurisprudencia, a Manila law school,
and passed the bar in 1909. He married Isidra Baldomero,
and the couple had one son, Pedro Jr.2
As with many other contemporary politicos—Isauro
Gabaldon, Jaime de Veyra, and Sergio Osmeña among
them—Guevara easily transitioned from being an
editorialist to an elected public servant. His political
career began in 1907, when he was elected as municipal
councillor in San Felipe Neri, Rizal Province. Two
years later he won election to the Philippine assembly,
representing Laguna Province, and he was re-elected in
1912 to a second term. In 1916, under the provisions of
the Jones Act, he was elected to the first of two terms in
the Philippine senate, representing a district that included
Manila and the provinces of Rizal, Laguna, and Bataan.
He served in the senate until his election as Resident
Commissioner. A well-respected jurist, Guevara chaired the
Philippine delegation to the Far Eastern Bar Conference in
Beijing, China, in 1921. A year later he joined a group of
prominent Filipinos who traveled to Washington, DC, as
part of the second Philippine independence mission.3
Upon Guevara’s return to the Philippines, senate
president and Nacionalista Party powerbroker Manuel
Quezon tapped his fellow senator to succeed Jaime
de Veyra as Resident Commissioner. Domestic political
jockeying momentarily complicated his nomination,
however, when the insular government set a special election to fill the impending senate vacancy. Democrats put
forward a nominee, but the Nacionalistas failed to produce
a consensus candidate. Desperate to retain the seat,
Quezon stalled by encouraging Guevara to remain in the
senate until a suitable candidate could be found. The U.S.
House of Representatives threatened not to seat the new
Resident Commissioner so long as he held his Manila seat,
forcing Guevara to resign and leaving Quezon to bargain
with Governor General Leonard Wood on the timing of
a special election. Nevertheless, the Filipino legislature
elected Guevara as Resident Commissioner on February
17, 1923.4 He won re-election in 1925, 1929, 1932,
and 1934 and served continuously until the position was
reorganized under the Commonwealth of the Philippines
in 1935.
When Guevara set off on the long voyage to
Washington, DC, in August 1923, a “monster parade”
accompanied him to his ship, the Associated Press
reported. A marching band and military cadets joined
the throng, with Guevara at its head wearing a barong,
a long embroidered shirt that symbolized Filipinos’ wish
for independence.5 Guevara arrived in the U.S. capital
in mid-September, months before the 68th Congress
(1923–1925) was set to convene in early December. Like
his predecessors, he played the part of diplomat rather
than legislator, in some measure because House Rules
prevented him from holding a committee assignment or
voting on final legislation on the floor. But he also seemed
quite comfortable working the press and serving as a public
advocate. In that aspect, he went to work immediately.
Even before he claimed his seat, he weighed in on
independence and growing tensions with the controversial
Governor General Wood.
From the start, Guevara’s independence pitch was more
nuanced than that of his colleague, Isauro Gabaldon, who
demanded nothing short of immediate and unfettered
self-rule. Guevara, the Los Angeles Times noted, “was
the opposite of the agitator type,” and while journeying
to Washington, he told Filipinos who met him during
a brief layover in Honolulu that the key to eventual
independence hinged on their ability to demonstrate “self-control”
in overseeing their affairs. While he demanded a
“final solution” to the Philippines’ status, he envisioned it
ideally as a kind of protectorate system “with a localized
responsibility, capable of bringing about the necessary
harmony and co-ordination of the different departments
of Government, for its efficient operations.”6 He admitted
that Japanese and European encroachments might be a
concern with full independence and, to that end, preferred
“a protectorate from the United States.” But, given a choice
between complete independence with no special grant of
U.S. military protection or the ambiguous governance
reasserted by U.S. officials after President Woodrow Wilson
left office, Guevara had a clear choice: “We unquestionably
stand for the former.”7
Guevara’s unhappiness with the current structure, like
that of so many Filipinos, derived from the ambiguities of
the Jones Act. On the one hand, the act granted the islands
a greater role in self-rule, including a popularly elected
senate. After several years, Manila officials believed that
they had fulfilled the spirit and the letter of that legislation
by creating a stable government. But, on the other hand,
the governor general still was empowered to override the
government and Filipino legislative initiatives “may be
disregarded any time.” While Filipinos were blamed “for
any inefficiency or failure” of governance, the governor
general seemed to accrue all credit for what went right.8
The newest occupant of the governor general’s post,
Leonard Wood, irritated matters by trying to reassert
control over the islands. In July 1923, his actions provoked
a mass resignation of Filipino politicos, including Quezon,
from the governor general’s cabinet. Later that fall, when
Secretary of War John Weeks sent a memorandum of
endorsement to Governor General Wood, Quezon and
Philippine house speaker Manuel Roxas ordered Guevara
to visit Secretary Weeks to express their displeasure with
Wood’s executive encroachments. Impatient for action,
the territorial legislature then dispatched a special mission
to Washington to request Wood’s recall and lobby for
immediate independence.9 “We do not object to General
Wood personally,” Guevara noted, trying to frame the issue
as something larger than a personal spat, “but to the office which he occupies and the method of his appointment.”10
In Boston for a speech at the Harvard Union, Guevara told
the Christian Science Monitor, “The struggle with General
Wood is merely a small incident in the bigger fight for full
self-government.”11
President Calvin Coolidge defended Wood and used
subsequent annual messages to request that Congress
grant the governor general more resources at the expense
of the insular government.12 Despite the Coolidge
administration’s clear efforts to reassert control over the
islands, independence efforts percolated in Congress in
1924. In February, the special mission, accompanied
by Guevara, testified before the Senate Committee on
Territories and Insular Possessions to support S. 912,
a bill authored by Chairman William King of Utah
that authorized Filipinos to convene a constitutional
convention. Once ratified and approved, U.S. military
forces would withdraw within six months. Predictably,
administration officials lined up against the bill. Secretary
of War Weeks argued independence would precipitate
a political collapse while the Navy’s Admiral Hilary P.
Jones testified about the need to retain the Philippines
to ensure U.S. strategic interests in East Asia. Governor
General Wood echoed these sentiments in a telegram
to the committee that Guevara and Gabaldon roundly
condemned.13 War Department staff later asked the House
Insular Affairs Committee to stall on its review of S. 912,
effectively killing it.14
Insular Affairs Committee Chairman Louis Fairfield
of Indiana submitted H.R. 8856 just as momentum on
S. 912 waned. The House bill granted commonwealth
status to the islands, allowed for a Filipino to be elected
as governor general, continued a bicameral legislature,
and also set out a judicial system. Controversially,
however, it created a presidentially appointed post of U.S.
commissioner empowered to veto legislation, contracts
and the governor general’s executive actions, and to muster
the armed forces of the Philippines. The commonwealth
period would last for 30 years, after which Filipinos would
vote in a plebiscite to maintain commonwealth status or to
declare independence.
Delegates from the independence mission supported the
broad outlines of the Fairfield bill but balked at the 30-year
commonwealth period and the notion of a commissioner
with unchecked power. Though Fairfield was amenable to
changing the bill, little support existed in Manila, and the
chairman sidelined the entire effort.15 Later that Congress,
Guevara attempted to revive interest in H.R. 8856. “The
structure of our political institutions,” Guevara said, was
built on a “weak base” of limited sovereignty. Emphasizing
that Congress “has never been reluctant … in the prompt
solution of those problems affecting the life, happiness, and
prosperity” of its citizens, he asked the Rules Committee to
send the bill to the House Floor, but it never resurfaced.16
Soon all momentum stalled as Congress adjourned for the
presidential nominating conventions and the fall elections.17
A wave of negative propaganda designed to curb
Philippine autonomy broke across the U.S. press in
late 1924. From November 1924 to January 1925, the
Washington Post published “Isles of Fear,” authored by
Katherine Mayo, who trafficked in racist stereotypes
and belittled the Philippines’ push for independence.
Retentionists, including the Post editorial board, seized
on the series and praised it for confirming their views.18
Guevara was one of a number of Filipino officials who
refuted Mayo, publishing a response with Isauro Gabaldon
in the Post. In a New York City speech, Guevara alleged
Mayo’s work as one component of a “campaign of
misrepresentation waged by the irreconcilable opponents of
Philippine independence … for their own benefits or that
of the interests they represent.” He stressed that Mayo’s
portrayals failed to convey the true “life, culture, and spirit
of a people or race.”19
Guevara also fought against attempts to separate parts
of the Philippines from the insular government. In May
1926, Robert Bacon of New York submitted H.R. 12772
to create a separate province intended to resolve the
“fundamental antipathy” between the Christian Filipinos
in the Luzon and Visayan Islands and Muslim Filipinos,
or Moros, in the Mindanao, Basilan, Palawan, and Sulu
Archipelago. According to Bacon, the Moros were “an
altogether distinct people from the Christian Filipinos … not only in language and religion but in physical type
and mental outlook.”20 The first Philippine commission
established a single province for Moro territory under the
control of a military governor.21 Bacon’s bill enabled the
governor general to make these appointments without the
consent of the Philippine senate. He argued that the Moros
were essentially a distinct people and that the insular
government had made no real attempt to integrate them.
Bacon’s underlying goal, however, seemed to be securing
key natural resources in Moro lands—namely, rubber.22
Guevara responded to Bacon on the House Floor one
month later. He dismissed the racial distinctions between
Christian and Muslim Filipinos, saying that “differences
in religion and civilization are the natural result of the
political situation which the Filipino people have been
forced to endure for the last 300 years” under foreign rule.
Guevara admitted that the Moros had no representatives
in the Philippine legislature, but under the Jones Act, only
the U.S. Congress could grant that right. To resolve the
issue, Guevara suggested an “amendment to the present
organic law … which would enfranchise the Moros and
permit them to elect their own legislators and governors
with … the same freedom of choice as that now enjoyed by
Christian Filipinos.” Guevara concluded, “Disintegration
of … the Philippine Islands can serve no useful purpose.”
Members of the Committee on Insular Affairs agreed, and
Bacon’s bill never left committee.23
After four years of stalwart opposition to Wood and
his policies, Guevara was presented with an opportunity
to reset relations when the governor general died
unexpectedly in August 1927. Guevara informed Manila
that the Coolidge administration wanted suggestions about
selecting a new governor general. The primary candidate
was Henry L. Stimson, the former Secretary of War in the
William H. Taft administration. President Coolidge asked
Stimson to visit the Philippines to assess the effectiveness
of the insular government. A retentionist himself, Stimson
nevertheless proved amenable to all sides. Unlike Wood,
Stimson honored Philippine sovereignty where it existed
and treated Filipino colleagues with respect. With
widespread support in Manila and Washington, President
Coolidge nominated Stimson on December 13, 1927.
When the Senate confirmed him four days later, Guevara
praised the appointment, calling it “a new era for the
islands [sic] government and people.”24
Despite this attempt to moderate relations with the
insular government, President Coolidge continued to
request more resources for the governor general’s office
in his annual messages. In January 1928, Frank Willis,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and
Insular Possessions, submitted S. 2292. That bill proposed
an increase in the salaries of 13 presidential appointees
and directed $125,000 from Philippine internal revenue
taxes toward hiring additional assistants and technical
advisers. A companion bill (H.R. 8567) was submitted by
House Insular Affairs Committee Chairman Edgar Kiess
of Pennsylvania. These measures placed the appointments
of technical advisers solely in the governor general’s
hands. Another Willis bill, S. 2787, and its companion,
H.R. 10074, proposed the appointment of governors for
the Muslim and non-Christian provinces of the islands
without the Philippine senate’s consent. Secretary of War
Dwight F. Davis and Governor General Stimson testified
in support of each of these bills to the dismay of Quezon,
who coordinated with Senate allies to block their passage
and asked other members to submit independence bills
as substitutes. Guevara prepared for battle in the
committee rooms.25
Guevara sparred with Chairman Kiess while
testifying against H.R. 8567. Among his eight points
of disagreement with the legislation, he argued that
the Kiess bill would weaken the Jones Act by curtailing
the Philippine legislature’s power to appropriate funds
by eliminating the “functions of the departments and
bureaus of the Philippine government.” Such an action
would reinforce “the colonial nature of the system
of government implanted in the Philippine Islands.”
Frustrated by Guevara’s stonewalling, Kiess demanded to
know why the Philippine legislature seemingly opposed
any congressional action. Guevara answered, “We are
opposed to any amendment to the Jones Act which will
mean a backward step” in achieving Philippine sovereignty. After testifying for two hours, Guevara suffered a heart
attack and was taken to a local hospital. He was scheduled
to testify against S. 2292 before the Senate Committee on
Territories and Insular Affairs the next day, but Gabaldon
took his place.26 Although S. 2292 and S. 2787 passed the
respective committees of jurisdiction in both chambers,
neither came to the House nor Senate Floors for a vote,
and the House versions languished in committee.27
Guevara balanced expanding Philippine sovereignty
with preserving its economy, particularly the sugar
industry. In March 1928, beet sugar proponent Charles
Timberlake of Colorado submitted H.J. Res. 214, a bill
to reduce the duty-free importation of Philippine sugar
from an unlimited number to 500,000 tons. Timberlake
noted precedent for his legislation and argued that U.S.
authorities “never contemplated forcing the American
farmer into competition with tropical labor 7,000 miles
across the Pacific.” Timberlake partially framed his
legislation as preventing the Philippines from becoming
“dependent on a single competitive export crop” in
accordance with “the universally accepted principle of crop
diversification.” Guevara asked Timberlake if it was fair
for the United States “to send any of its products to the
Philippine Islands without any limitations … while the
Philippine Islands are … limited in the sending of their
products” to the United States, but Timberlake dodged the
question. Guevara countered with his standard proposal for
independence, “May I suggest that the best remedy is to
get rid of the Philippine Islands, and we are now ready to
be gotten rid of by the United States.”28 The bill died when
Governor General Stimson blasted it in the press.29
When the House adjourned in May 1928, Guevara
remained in the United States. In June he joined Quezon
at the Democratic and Republican presidential nominating
conventions to promote Philippine independence. At the
Republican convention in Kansas City, Missouri, the pair
successfully lobbied against the inclusion of a platform
that called for limiting Philippine rights. In Houston,
Texas, Guevara and Quezon, with an assist from Senator
King, convinced Democrats to retain a platform calling for
independence that echoed the 1924 platform.30
Isauro Gabaldon resigned in July 1928, leaving Guevara
the sole Filipino Resident Commissioner for nine months
just as the battle over sugar tariffs was heating up. In
December 1928, the House Ways and Means Committee
convened hearings on tariff readjustments in anticipation
of President-elect Herbert Hoover’s request to revise the
Tariff Act of 1922. A worldwide depression in sugar prices
and the rise of an aggressive sugar lobby threatened the
free trade privileges enjoyed by the Philippines since the
enactment of that legislation.
Testifying before the committee in early 1929, Guevara
started with a simple question that echoed his perpetual
message: “[W]hile the Philippine Islands are under the
American flag, will the United States be justified in
imposing limitation on our present free trade?” Guevara
reminded members that imposing trade restrictions was
tantamount to “economic slavery, because while the United
States is free to send to the Philippine Islands all her
products and merchandise, we will not be free to export”
the same products. When committee members asked
Guevara repeatedly what the Philippines did to cultivate
trade with neighboring countries, Guevara reiterated that
U.S. tariff restrictions compelled nations to restrict trade
against the Philippines as a territory of the United States.31
On March 7, 1929, President Hoover called an
extraordinary session of Congress to consider proposals
for agriculture relief and tariff revisions. In light of these
initiatives, the Philippine legislature sent a special mission
to Washington to negotiate tariff revisions. Arriving in April
1929, the mission was led by Philippine house speaker
Manuel Roxas and senator Sergio Osmeña and joined by
newly elected Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias.32
The next hurdle Guevara and the mission faced came
in the form of H.R. 2667, submitted by Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Willis Hawley of Oregon. It called
for a revision of the tariff schedules. The bill passed the
House without many changes that affected the Philippines.
But led by beet supporter Chairman Reed Smoot of Utah,
the Senate Committee on Finance offered amendments
sharply increasing the duty on sugar and other products
from the Philippines. In contrast to Osias’s fiery testimony, Guevara submitted a prepared statement to the committee
in June 1929, again requesting equal treatment between
the United States and Philippines. He once more leveraged
the economic conflict to request independence. Retained
as a territory, Guevara noted, the matter amounted to
interstate commerce. Passing the amendments, however,
“would place the United States in the same position of
Great Britain in her dealings with the thirteen American
Colonies which brought about their separation from
the mother country.”33 Smoot’s amendments gained
little traction before the committee reported the bill in
September 1929.
When the bill reached the Senate Floor, fresh
amendments spurred a renewed campaign for
independence. Louisiana Senator Edwin Broussard
again sought to increase the sugar duty, but also offered
a path to independence. Some Senators balked when
the independence issue crept into the tariff debate. Both
amendments failed, but this opened the door for Guevara
and Osias to once again campaign for the release of the
Philippines. Guevara addressed the House on December
7 and again on December 13, each time stressing the
economic argument for an independent Philippines.
Despite rising sentiment and support from Democratic
Members, Republicans in both chambers stood firm
against independence.34 The final act, popularly known
as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff, became law in June 1930. It
did not significantly affect Philippine exports, but neither
did it feature the independence provisions Guevara and his
colleagues had encouraged.35
Guevara carried forward his comparison of the islands
to the American colonies as he continued his pleas for
independence across the United States.36 In the summer
of 1931, Quezon published a report postulating a 10-year trial period of autonomous government ending in a
plebiscite. The report muddled the insular government’s
official stance on independence. Quezon seemed to favor
an American protectorate with only limited independence.
The legislature instructed Guevara to continue to press for
full independence and urged him weeks later to correct
a Washington Post editorial which had presumed Moro
opposition to independence.37 Guevara struggled to
respond to this misinformation as Congress prepared to
convene the 72nd Congress (1931–1933) in December
1931, and government leaders Osmeña and Roxas
themselves traveled to Washington to make their case.
Despite the efforts of retentionists to portray
the Philippines as deeply riven over the question of
independence, supporters in Congress had grown plentiful
enough by 1932 to advance a new bill for Philippine
independence. Named for the chairman of the House
Insular Affairs Committee, Butler Hare of South Carolina,
the proposal, once approved by the insular legislature,
would provide for an immediate constitutional convention
followed by an eight-year schedule for independence.
Speaker John Nance Garner of Texas rallied Democratic
support and brought the bill to the floor under a
suspension of the rules, limiting debate to 40 minutes.
During debate, Guevara proclaimed that this bill would
“decide the fate of 13,000,000 people.” Describing prior
legislative efforts as temporary fixes, Guevara deemed that
the Hare measure embodied the “redemption of American
pledges … and the fruition of our hopes for separate
nationhood.” At the conclusion of Guevara’s unusually
impassioned rhetoric, many Members rose in applause.
With Guevara watching, the House approved the bill by
a large majority, 306 to 47.38 The Hawes–Cutting bill, a
competing Senate version of the Hare bill, led a conference
committee to increase the window to independence to 10
years, but the final legislation was completed before the
year was out.
Congress had passed the legislation over the stern
objections of the Hoover administration, however, and
President Hoover vetoed the bill on January 13, 1933.
Wasting no time, the House overrode the veto that same
day 274 to 94. After the vote, Guevara expressed “the
gratitude of the Filipino people, which I say to both
Republicans and Democrats for their altruistic stand on
the … independence question.”39 The Senate followed suit
on January 17 by a vote of 66 to 24, and the combined
Hare–Hawes–Cutting Act became law.40
However, the
Philippine legislature still had to approve the measure, and infighting there scuttled the bill. Guevara sided with
his mentor Quezon, who feared a loss of influence, had
the bill succeeded. After Quezon rallied the votes to reject
the independence bill in the Philippine senate, Guevara
accompanied him back to Washington to produce another
independence bill.41
Throughout early 1934, Guevara and Osias occupied
opposite sides of the Hare–Hawes–Cutting law debate.
Whereas Osias publicly split from Quezon over rejecting
the law in December 1933, Guevara lobbied for passage
of another bill. In January 1934, Guevara submitted a
concurrent resolution from the Philippine legislature
rejecting the Hare–Hawes–Cutting Act. He expressed
his “profound gratitude” for Congress’s actions, but his
“patriotic duty” compelled Guevara to take another course.
Acknowledging that “many of the Members of this House
voted … in the belief that my stand was an expression of
the will of the Filipino people whom I represent,” Guevara
subordinated his preference for the Hare–Hawes–Cutting
bill to “the majority of the Philippine Legislature,” who
rejected it.42
Quezon found a favorable climate for a new
independence bill in Washington, where the new Franklin
D. Roosevelt administration was eager to be done with the
issue. Negotiations resulted in the Tydings–McDuffie Act
(H.R. 8573, S. 3055), which granted independence and
removed military bases from the Philippines while providing
authorization to negotiate for a future U.S. naval presence.
Guevara endorsed the bill as “the epitome and synthesis of
America’s aim and purpose in the Philippines” and further
ensured that this attempt at independence would meet
approval in the Philippine legislature.43 The bill quickly
passed both the House and Senate, and President Roosevelt
signed it into law on March 24, 1934.44
Guevara involved himself little in negotiations over
Tydings–McDuffie, focusing instead on the preservation
of the Philippine economy. Days after passage of Tydings–McDuffie, Guevara protested a clause in H.R. 9790
that raised the price of coconut oil to 3 cents per pound.
He cautioned that the price increase could “dynamite”
approval of the new independence bill because the tax
would exacerbate the “economic sacrifices of the Filipino
people, which are already … unbearable” and cripple the
nation’s prominent coconut industry. Guevara pointed out
the “inconsistency” of Congress to pass “a new organic law
and, before the President’s signature to it is dry, penalize the
recipient with additional burdens and oppressive inflictions.”
Guevara sent letters to President Roosevelt as well as six
prominent Senators and submitted a public statement
voicing his objections. Representative John McDuffie of
Alabama echoed Guevara’s concerns and suggested that the
tax violated the spirit of the independence measure that bore
his name. Under this onslaught, the tax bill wallowed in
committee, and the Philippine legislature approved Tydings–McDuffie in May 1934.45
Guevara’s next economic hurdle was a direct
consequence of the national bank emergency and the
devaluation of the dollar. Representative McDuffie
introduced H.R. 9459 and Senator Millard Tydings
of Maryland introduced S. 3530 to settle the resultant
devaluation profit in the Philippine currency reserves,
enabling the U.S. Treasury to transfer the balance to the
Philippine insular government. While advocating for
the bill, Guevara noted how the devaluation hurt the
Philippines’ ability to collect duty rates and obtain full
returns on railroad bonds. In two cases, Guevara estimated
the Philippines lost about $13 million. Guevara appealed
to his colleagues’ sense of fair play in restoring the funds.
In a practical sense, the restoration of the funds would
“forestall economic complications and … prevent financial
debilitation” in a nation on the verge of independence.
The Tydings bill passed the Senate easily and, after a
vigorous debate in the House, passed on a 188 to 147 vote.
President Roosevelt signed it into law on June 19, 1934.46
As early as June 1934, Guevara showed signs that he
had wearied of Filipino politics, feeling that he had been
buffeted by insular divisions one time too many. Reports
emerged about Guevara advocating for a protectorate for
the Philippines, claiming that full independence would
lead to disaster. His political patron Quezon dismissed
the claims. Guevara had also applied to be a delegate
at the 1934 Philippine constitutional convention. In light of the rumored statements, Quezon threatened to
pull his support for Guevara’s candidacy.47 However, the
threat did not hurt Guevara’s prospects, as he was selected
to the constitutional convention in July 1934 and was
re-elected as Resident Commissioner one month later.48
The constitutional convention worked from July 1934
to February 1935 on a draft which President Roosevelt
approved in March. Following a plebiscite, the Philippines
was established as a commonwealth in May 1935.49
During his last term in the 74th Congress (1935–1937),
Guevara continued to focus on preserving the economy
and the security of the Philippines. He lobbied the House
to relax tariffs in the Jones–Costigan and Revenue Acts
of 1934. Guevara also began openly advocating for a
protectorate system rather than complete independence,
fearing that Japan was a “real menace to Philippine
independence.” He relayed open threats made by a
Japanese diplomat in Manila before asking the House
to consider amending H.R. 3482, a bill pledging the
commitment of U.S. military forces to Latin American
countries, to include the Philippines. Richard Welch of
California reminded the House that Guevara “was in favor
of absolute independence” during debate over the Tydings–McDuffie Act. “I have not changed my mind,” Guevara
replied, but he stated that he wished for “independence
for the Filipino people, but not for the benefit of some
other nation” to swallow it up. Guevara held no faith in
the ability of a neutralization treaty to protect his nation
after Japan’s decision to ignore the Kellogg–Briand Pact
and leave the League of Nations. When Welch continued
to needle Guevara, the Resident Commissioner countered,
“[I]f reversing my opinion … will mean security for the
Philippine Islands I will not hesitate to reverse my stand or
my opinion.” H.R. 3482 did not pass, but a companion
Senate bill (S. 707) added the Philippines to the protection
list and it became law.50
In August 1935, Guevara returned to Manila to vote in
the presidential elections, and he brought his protectorate
proposal with him. In accordance with these views, he
rescinded his support of the Tydings–McDuffie Act.
Nevertheless, he endorsed Manuel Quezon’s campaign
for president of the Philippine Commonwealth. In a
newspaper interview at his home, Guevara stated his
preference for a protectorate in the presence of Quezon
and two other public figures, General Emilio Aguinaldo
and Bishop Gregorio Aglipay, who were running against
Quezon. Guevara claimed to have spoken with a number
of Members of Congress “and it is my opinion that a …
majority would favor the extension of American protection
to the islands.” The reporter noted that in private Quezon
reacted with “tacit approval.”51 Soon afterward, though, he
blasted Guevara’s proposal in a public statement.52
One week after Quezon won the presidency in a
landslide, Guevara announced his retirement from politics
effective on October 1, 1935, even though his term as
Resident Commissioner did not officially expire until
February 14, 1936.53 After leaving office, he started a
private law practice in Manila. The Philippines Free Press
complimented his “long and distinguished career in
government, culminating in his many years as Resident
Commissioner in Washington.”54 Besides law, Guevara
pursued a number of business interests and continued to
advocate for a Philippine protectorate as a private citizen.55
On January 19, 1938, Guevara suffered a fatal stroke
while arguing a case before the Philippine supreme court
and died in Manila. Calling him “one of the dearest
friends I have ever had,” President Quezon credited
Guevara as a “devoted and very able public servant” who
“stood his ground regardless of whether or not it affected
him adversely politically.” Guevara was interred in the
Cementerio del Norte in Manila.56
View Record in the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress
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