Hawaii
The Hawaiian Islands had long been a convenient port of call for American whalers, seal hunters, and traders to China. Since the 1820s, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had sent Protestant missionaries from New England, many of whom eventually settled permanently in Hawaii. The missionaries’ successes led the board to proclaim the islands Christianized and to turn over control of the missions to the locals. American settlers soon turned their energies from missionary work to profiteering and invested heavily in sugar cultivation. Hawaiian monarchs provided favorable land grants. By 1870 these American descendants had become the “Big Five” sugar companies: Ladd & Company, H. Hackfeld & Company, C. Brewer & Company, Castle & Cooke, and Alexander & Baldwin.181
Bayonet Constitution
The assertion of haole influence changed the career trajectory of a young military student, Robert W. Wilcox. The government recalled Wilcox, a Native Hawaiian, from an exchange program in Italy, and he returned to Honolulu without a promised prestigious military appointment. In frustration, Wilcox turned to the more radical elements of the National Reform Party. Party conspirators plotted to force King Kalakaua’s abdication in favor of his sister, Liliuokalani, who Native Hawaiians believed would show a firmer hand against the haole government. Following a brief self-imposed exile in San Francisco in 1888 in fear of reprisal, Wilcox and his coconspirators moved forward with their plan on July 30, 1889. Relying on his military training, he marched roughly 150 men on Iolani Palace only to find the palace closed and the King spirited away. After hours of being holed up in a nearby bungalow under bombardment from the Royal Guard, Wilcox and his followers surrendered. First charged with treason, they were tried for conspiracy. A Native-Hawaiian jury found the defendants not guilty.184
Rise of the Republic
Queen Liliuokalani’s first opportunity to consolidate power and reverse the Bayonet Constitution arrived in the 1892 elections. However, Native Hawaiians split between the queen’s National Reform Party and the more radical Liberal Party, which counted Wilcox among its members, while the planters’ Reform Party held a plurality of seats. Liliuokalani desperately sought to appoint and maintain a new government, but the three parties refused to establish a stable partnership. No one party held a majority, leaving the situation, in U.S. Minister John Stevens’s word, “feverish.”187
Liliuokalani gave the annexationists the excuse they needed when she ended the 1892 legislative session by attempting to install a new constitution more favorable to Native Hawaiians. The Annexation Club reacted first and swiftly proclaimed itself a “Committee of Safety.” The committee reached out to Minister Stevens and secured a promise of American military aid. With the support of American troops landing in Honolulu, the committee launched its revolution on January 15, 1893. Sanford Dole, who had since ascended to the Hawaiian supreme court and the queen’s privy council, was offered and accepted the presidency of the provisional government. Liliuokalani’s ministers met to discuss the crisis with the resident diplomats who advised them to avoid using force against the rebels. When two of the ministers met with Stevens, he refused to provide any assistance to the government. Working as a clerk at the government building, Prince Kuhio dutifully followed Dole’s orders to send the letters out announcing the end of his own family’s reign. Liliuokalani, Hawaii’s final monarch, surrendered peacefully just after sunset.189
All hope of immediate annexation evaporated once President Grover Cleveland took office two weeks later. A Democrat wary of angering his base in the Jim Crow South, Cleveland repudiated the protectorate status Stevens had arranged, halted progress on the annexation treaty in the Senate, and arranged for House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman James Blount of Georgia to investigate conditions in Hawaii before moving forward. Blount blasted Stevens’s involvement in the rebellion and predicted the Hawaiian republic would not last long. “The undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen,” he wrote, “against the Provisional Government and against annexation.”191
Annexation and Transition
Despite this unrest, the Hawaiian republic continued to lobby for annexation in the hopes of boosting their flagging sugar trade. A path to annexation opened following the presidential election of Ohio Governor William McKinley in 1896. The Republican Party platform specifically called for U.S. control over the Hawaiian Islands. On June 16, 1897, McKinley sent a new treaty to the Senate for approval, but intense protests from the Japanese government shone a spotlight on the heavy presence of Asian contract laborers working Hawaii’s sugar plantations. Progress on the treaty stalled, and the Senate adjourned on July 24 without acting on it. It became apparent that American fear over the ballooning population of Asian laborers on the islands would prove to be the greatest hurdle to Hawaiian annexation.197
Asian immigration to the Hawaiian Islands began in 1852 when the first ship from South China arrived in Honolulu Harbor laden with contract laborers for the sugar plantations. Among the early immigrants from China were relatives of future Senators Daniel K. Akaka and Hiram L. Fong, whose father, Sau Howe Fong, was recruited by a family member working for one of the Big Five sugar companies. The elder Fong’s experience reflected the experiences of many Chinese immigrants in Hawaii. After finishing his contract in 1877, he found work at a fertilizer plant. Initially hired for five years, Chinese immigrants often settled their families in the islands once their contracts ended.198
About this record Queen Liliuokalani took the throne in 1891 determined to restore the power of the monarchy and Native Hawaiians. This memorial, signed by Queen Liliuokalani on December 19, 1898, was her last attempt to return control of her homeland to Native Hawaiians.
Dole’s government attempted to address the influx of Japanese laborers in 1897 when they turned back three ships with more than 1,000 Japanese immigrants aboard. The Japanese government responded by sending its warship Naniwa to Honolulu Harbor, causing the McKinley administration to dispatch the U.S. Navy to Hawaii as well, while U.S. Secretary of State John Sherman mediated the Japanese immigration issue. The increasingly martial Japanese government viewed Hawaiian annexation as an attempt to avoid renegotiating the highly profitable contract labor agreement between the two nations. Japanese diplomats protested to the United States, but Secretary Sherman more or less lied to Japanese diplomats that no annexation was contemplated. “It is the white race against the yellow,” one Honolulu newspaper opined. “Nothing but annexation can save the islands.”200
When the War of 1898 began in late April that year, events moved quickly and brought the Hawaiian Islands to the nation’s attention with a new urgency. The destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in early May made the Pacific Ocean an important component of the war. Hawaii suddenly became a key way station for the U.S. military as it provided supplies for U.S. troops to capture Manila and to hold the Philippines. The annexation of Hawaii had been revived mere months after its sudden demise.202
Representative Francis Newlands of Nevada introduced H. Res. 259 to annex Hawaii on May 4, 1898, and the House debated the resolution a month later, from June 11 to June 14. Champ Clark of Missouri opposed annexation because, in his view, Native Hawaiians could not become Americans. He dismissed them as “a lot of non-descript Asiatico-Polynesian ignoramuses.” And he ended his speech with a warning about a future he wanted to avoid: “How can we endure our shame when a Chinese Senator from Hawaii, with his pigtail hanging down his back, with his pagan joss in his hand, shall rise from his curule chair and in pigeon [sic] English proceed to chop logic with George Frisbie Hoar or Henry Cabot Lodge? O tempora! O mores!”203
While Champ Clark’s racial prejudices were widely shared, Hawaii’s key position in the Pacific carried the day. “We owe the most solemn duty to reciprocate this friendly spirit,” said Representative John Mitchell of New York, “and see that no possible harm shall come to them by reason of it.”204 When the House debated and voted on Newlands’s resolution on June 15, 1898, it was approved, 290 to 91. Once Congress had decided to annex Hawaii by joint resolution rather than by treaty, Senate passage was certain. The Senate, having considered similar legislation several times over, wasted little time deliberating and approved the resolution, 42 to 21, on July 6. The President signed H. Res. 259 into law the next day.205
Congressional indifference in the 56th Congress (1899–1901) allowed Wisconsin Senator John C. Spooner to strip out the property qualifications and insert an independent judiciary in the commission’s bill.207 President McKinley signed the resultant Hawaiian Organic Act into law on April 30, 1900. Like former territorial legislation, the Organic Act set aside the territorial governor, secretary, and judges as presidential appointments subject to Senate confirmation. McKinley obligingly nominated Sanford Dole as Hawaii’s first territorial governor. The bill also created an elected bicameral legislature and provided for the election of a Territorial Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives.208 Though appointed officials retained considerable power over local politics, these changes ultimately restored Native Hawaiians as a majority of the electorate.
Meanwhile, Native Hawaiians asserted their renewed political power. The Organic Act went into effect in June 1900 and provided just enough time to hold the election for the first Territorial Delegate. While haoles adopted the political parties of their new nation, Native Hawaiians merged two patriotic leagues into the Hawaiian Independent Party (HIP) and demanded “Hawai‘i for the Hawaiians” and “Equal Rights for the People.” Robert Wilcox headed the HIP ticket. Wilcox distanced himself from the anti-haole tactics of the HIP’s radical wing, and the party changed its name to Home Rule. When Democrats nominated Kuhio’s older brother, David Kawananakoa, rumors swirled that Wilcox might withdraw his candidacy to avoid splitting the Native-Hawaiian vote. Unnerved, Wilcox hardened his rhetoric and lashed out at the haoles who had oppressed Native Hawaiians. He vowed to work toward the removal of Dole as territorial governor and staged rallies to highlight haoles imperialism.210 Wilcox’s demagoguery bore fruit, and on November 6, 1900, he captured a narrow plurality of the votes to become Hawaii’s first Delegate to Congress.
Creating a Legal Identity
Of the 10 Hawaiian Delegates to the U.S. Congress who served between 1900 and 1959, half were Native Hawaiian: Robert Wilcox, Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole, William P. Jarrett, Victor S. (Kaleoaloha) Houston, and Samuel Wilder King. Together, these Delegates represented the islands in Congress for more than two-thirds of the period between annexation and statehood. These Native Hawaiians represented three different parties but wrestled with similar insular concerns. Arriving in Washington, most struggled to adjust to life on the mainland, and all faced congressional colleagues who knew little about the Hawaiian Islands. Granted floor privileges and the ability to introduce legislation, Hawaiian Delegates were nevertheless left without a vote and had to rely on personal relationships and lobbying efforts to cajole Congress into providing aid for the territory.
Robert Wilcox made a rough start of Hawaii’s early congressional efforts when he failed to stir much sympathy in Washington, DC. During his tenure as a member of the Home Rule Party, he was unable to caucus with either Republicans or Democrats. He wound up on the Private Land Claims and Coinage, Weights, and Measures Committees; neither were plum assignments. Additionally, his anti-haole campaign and unsteady English hindered his effectiveness.211
In many ways, Kuhio set the tone for Hawaiian Delegates. He sought to correct congressional misconceptions about the islands through both formal and informal means. Like Wilcox, the prince made few floor speeches and did most of his work in committees, frequently testifying at length. Unlike Wilcox, Kuhio maintained far more confidence among his peers after years spent as an equal in foreign courts. Kuhio’s successors continued this trend and acted more often as ambassadors than empowered legislators.
Kuhio quickly learned the depth of Members’ ignorance regarding the islands while attempting to secure funding to repair lighthouses in the territory. Bounced back and forth between the territorial lighthouse board, the Navy Department, the Appropriations Committee, and Speaker Joe Cannon, Kuhio discovered belatedly that some officials incorrectly believed that Hawaii was ineligible for federal funds.213
About this object Illinois Representative James R. Mann and his wife wear leis during a 1915 congressional trip to Hawaii. The caption notes that they were “learning Hawaiian customs.”
The prince extended his educational campaign to sponsored tours of the islands beginning in 1907. These semiannual excursions often attracted funding from Hawaiian businesses and the territorial legislature itself. Members brought their families and enjoyed the full hospitality of the islands. These tours generally led to increased attention to Hawaiian needs back in Washington, DC. “I do not hesitate to say that I believe that the American congress will do a great deal for you this next session,” Representative William Wilson of Illinois wrote to Kuhio after the 1915 tour. “I think you will find that the trip was of great benefit to you in that respect, as it was to us in every way.”215
Kuhio’s successors faced similar misapprehensions about Hawaii’s status under the Organic Act. In the 71st Congress (1929–1931), Victor Houston struggled to extend provisions for federal highways that the Bureau of Public Roads had withheld for eight years because the territory had not been explicitly mentioned in the law.216 William Jarrett wrestled with the strictures of the Organic Act throughout his tenure. He repeatedly testified before committees that, under the act, the territorial legislature required congressional approval to fund even basic governmental services like housing assistance and park management.217 Samuel Wilder King continued to malign the act’s obstruction in 1940 when Congress failed to approve reapportionment on the islands, leaving the territorial legislature under the control of Oahu’s more cosmopolitan delegates.218 Houston and King benefited from military contacts gained during their service in the U.S. Navy, and King in particular leaned on them to open wider avenues for lobbying in DC.219
About this object Hawaiian Delegate Victor S. (Kaleoaloha) Houston (right), and his wife, Pinao Brickwood Houston, present a lei—handmade by Mrs. Houston—to Speaker Nicholas Longworth (center) in 1929.
Legislative Interests
Early Hawaiian Delegates like Wilcox and Kuhio faced much greater political pressure on the islands. Both traveled to and from the mainland frequently in order to shore up support in a still uncertain political environment. Their greatest concerns were filling in the gaps the Organic Act had left behind. Wilcox clarified the terms of territorial senators and sought to transfer to the federal government the administrative responsibility for a community on the island of Molokai where people living with leprosy had been quarantined, a decision that likely cost him his seat after a visiting Congressman implied the United States would seek to relocate the residents upon taking control. In contrast, Kuhio drew federal attention to what had inspired annexation in the first place: the strategic position of the islands in the Pacific. He brought jobs and federal money to Hawaii to expand U.S. military resources. As a Republican, the prince also prioritized the economic concerns of his party’s wealthy haole elites, most notably shipping concerns and protection of the sugar industry. Hawaii had been incorporated with the clear eventual goal of statehood, but Hawaiian businesses led by the Big Five and political elites were far more concerned with solidifying the status quo in the territory’s early years.220
Where Kuhio began to diverge from his Republican bosses was in the “rehabilitation” of the Native-Hawaiian people. After years of haole control over nearly all facets of life during the republic, the economic strength of Native Hawaiians had waned considerably.221 A homesteading program had been in the minds of Hawaiians since before the Organic Act. Wilcox had championed a similar program that aimed to benefit all Hawaiians, though that bill ultimately went nowhere. When Kuhio introduced the Hawaiian Rehabilitation Bill in April 1920, he presented it in testimony as “the first opportunity given to a poor man.” Kuhio’s version of homesteading was intended as a solution to what he saw as his people’s decline.222
Kuhio intended to use the former Hawaiian Crown lands for this new homesteading program quickly renamed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. The Crown lands had long been a preoccupation of Kuhio. Until her death in 1917, Queen Liliuokalani pressured Kuhio to help her reacquire the lands ceded first to the republic and then to the American government. The prince dutifully made requests, but Congress and the territorial legislature held the lands under leases until 1920 and continually denied the claims. The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act took advantage of the leases’ expirations to set aside 200,000 acres for 99-year leases to homesteaders who qualified as at least half Native Hawaiian. The bill, as passed, had many flaws. Successful lobbying by the Big Five ensured that the best lands were retained for sugar plantations, and the arbitrary nature of the Native-Hawaiian requirement meant that new generations often had trouble holding on to their family’s land.223
King Sugar
Republicans spent a great deal of time attending to the concerns of the sugar industry, particularly the constant labor shortages. By 1900 the Japanese population on the islands was roughly 60,000; 40,000 more arrived in the seven years after annexation. A significant number of these immigrants were women, which led to more permanent issei settlement in Hawaii. Planters faced with the abolition of the contract labor system after annexation encouraged family emigration to keep laborers living and working on the plantations. This new system culminated in the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1907 between the United States and Japan, in which Japan restricted emigration to the United States, but retained a loophole for the immediate relatives of immigrants already living there. The loophole resulted in more female and family migration and crystalized the permanent settlement of Japanese laborers in Hawaii.225
Native Hawaiians like Kuhio openly derided the Japanese population as “un-Americanizing the territory.” Some of this unease developed due to Japan’s rapid militarization and its tendency to engage in gunboat diplomacy. With the United States seemingly uninterested in building a Pacific defense on the foundation provided in the wake of the Spanish-American War, Hawaiians worried about Japan and the numerous emigrants the nation sent to the islands. Native Hawaiians and haoles alike feared the Asian majority likely to arise when the second generation of laborers, entitled to citizenship by birth after annexation, at last gained the vote. Kuhio responded to these fears by combating U.S. objections to importing Chinese immigrants whom the prince viewed much more favorably. The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act also prevented Japanese people from working on federal construction projects. The efforts of Hawaiian politicians paralleled what was occurring on the mainland, which led to complete Japanese exclusion in the Immigration Act of 1924.226
Indeed, despite simmering racial tension on the islands, Hawaii’s racial conflicts were typically rather muted in comparison to conditions on the mainland. Asian labor was vital to the territory’s key industry, and many Japanese and Chinese immigrants actively invited and encouraged assimilation to American cultural norms. Many converted to Christianity, and second generations moved on from the sugar plantations to more industrial and professional careers. The Pan-Pacific Union (formerly Hands Around the Pacific) arose to represent Asian laborers and address racial concerns on the islands.228 These concerns took on a new and dangerous form beginning in 1931 in response to an explosive legal case that threatened not only racial violence, but the territory’s very sovereignty.
The Massie Affair and the Jones–Costigan Act
On the night of September 21, 1931, a white woman named Thalia Massie, the wife of U.S. Navy Lieutenant Thomas Massie, was attacked after leaving a party alone. Badly beaten—her jaw had been broken—she told police that a gang of “local boys” had forced her into their car, driven to a field, and there had beaten and raped her. Honolulu police charged five young men—two Japanese, two Native Hawaiians, and one Chinese Hawaiian—after Thalia Massie identified four of the men as her attackers. A sensationalized trial followed in which stories headlined on the mainland constantly shifted and evidence remained sparse. The jury, largely made up of Native Hawaiians and Asian Americans, was unable to come to a verdict. A mistrial was declared in early December.229
The combined series of events prompted a violent storm of emotion and denunciation from Hawaiians, the mainland press, the Navy, and—most ominously—the U.S. Congress. Many on Capitol Hill now pictured Hawaii through this racialized lens, concerned that the territorial government remained helpless to protect white inhabitants. More than one Representative responded by proposing territorial reorganization, and a Senate resolution (S. Res. 134) requested a Justice Department investigation of the islands’ law enforcement efforts. In the resultant hearing, the Justice Department suggested an end to the residence requirement for appointed officials in Hawaii. No immediate change was forthcoming, but the issue did not go away.231
About this object John Rankin, a Representative from Mississippi, introduced legislation in 1933 opposing Hawaiian statehood.
The final major obstacle to a unified Hawaiian approach to statehood—the Big Five sugar companies—was removed after passage of the Jones–Costigan Act (H.R. 8861) of 1934. In the depths of the Great Depression and under immense pressure from mainland agricultural lobbies, Congress greatly reduced sugar quotas for Hawaii relative to the states. The issue became compounded when the Agriculture Department used outdated figures to set Hawaii’s quota lower than it would have otherwise been. The new quota had an almost immediate effect. Sugar production in the islands dropped by 8 to 10 percent and farmers abandoned thousands of acres of fields. Perhaps more worrisome for the future of the territory, the Jones–Costigan Act set a troubling precedent by classifying Hawaii as a “foreign” market for the purpose of future reductions.233 The Big Five’s lobbying arm, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA), alleged unconstitutionality and unsuccessfully challenged the legislation in court. The Big Five had long relied on this lobbying network and often bypassed the elected Delegate whenever he proved to be inconvenient. After Jones–Costigan, the HSPA met and agreed that only statehood could guarantee equal economic privileges.234
Hawaiian Statehood: Gradually, Then Suddenly
Delegate Kuhio promised to offer legislation for statehood as early as 1910 but did not put forward the first statehood proposal until 1919. It received no support from the HSPA and quietly died in the Committee on Territories. In 1927, when asked about statehood, Sanford Dole’s longtime ally, Honolulu Advertiser publisher Lorrin Thurston, responded, “Hawaii needs statehood as much as a cat needs two tails.” Victor Houston appeared to genuinely support statehood when he proposed it in 1931, but his bill drowned amid the deluge of bad press surrounding the Massie affair. When Houston offered his bill on December 9, 1931, three days after the mistrial in the Massie case, Congress had practically ruled out statehood.236
About this object This campaign button promotes the reelection of Samuel Wilder King as Hawaii’s Delegate to the U.S. Congress. King ran on a pro-statehood platform in 1934 and continued lobbying for statehood throughout his four terms in the House of Representatives.
King immediately reintroduced his statehood bill in the 75th Congress (1937–1939). In addition, he worked with Senator Tydings to form a high profile Joint Committee on Hawaii to more comprehensively study the territory’s fitness for statehood.238 The territorial legislature appropriated $20,000 for Hawaii’s Equal Rights Commission (a statehood group created by the territorial legislature in 1935) to prepare for the hearings. Though supporters of statehood again rushed to plead their case before the joint committee, opponents voiced their own concerns. Native-Hawaiian dissenters were particularly worried that statehood would only allow further centralization of power under the Big Five. Most arguments against Hawaiian statehood, however, pointed to the large Asian population on the islands that opponents insisted could never be “truly thoroughly, fundamentally, and unequivocally American,” especially given their suspect loyalties, insular communities, and tendencies to vote in a bloc.239
About this object Speaker William Bankhead of Alabama calls the House to order during a session of the 75th Congress (1937–1939), when Delegate Samuel Wilder King introduced his second Hawaii statehood bill.
Additionally, the Joint Committee on Hawaii determined that Congress could not act further on statehood until “the sentiment of the people” could be established.241 King pressed the territorial legislature for a plebiscite on statehood, which it authorized in 1939 for the following November. The legislature then placed the Equal Rights Commission, in coordination with the HSPA, in charge of the statehood campaign. Taking Congress’s fears over Japan into consideration, the commission changed its campaign from immediate statehood to eventual statehood. The question “Do you favor statehood for Hawaii?” was vaguely worded and allowed for equivocation, much to King’s dismay. A Japanese diplomat sowed further unrest by characterizing Hawaiian Japanese as “all determined to undergo great sacrifices for Japan during the present uneasy condition.” Just before the plebiscite King denounced as un-American any opposition due to prejudice against Japanese Americans.242
The plebiscite passed with 67 percent of voters favoring statehood, far from the resounding 80 percent King and other statehood proponents had hoped for and predicted. Furthermore, the vague wording and shifting campaign of the Equal Rights Commission meant that little could be done with the result.243 King did what he could to address concerns of Japanese citizenship: passing a bill to naturalize all women born prior to Hawaiian annexation.
The next step toward statehood came into focus following a handful of nationwide surveys conducted during this period. Fortune magazine found in 1939 that “fewer people in the U.S. were willing to go to war to defend the Hawaiian Islands … than Canada,” and a 1941 Gallup poll reported 48 percent of Americans favored statehood for Hawaii. For statehood advocates, these results suggested that the American people needed to become better educated on Hawaiian issues.244
Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941, put all concerns of statehood on hold. The islands fell under martial law. King ceased agitating for statehood and instead spent much of his time traveling back and forth between Hawaii and Washington, DC. He defended the rights of Japanese Americans in the territory and urged restraint for the military government.245 In Hawaii, many Asian Americans put politics on hold to enlist in the war effort and combat anti-Asian sentiment. Future Senator Hiram Fong, a Chinese American who had won election to the territorial legislature in 1938, forfeited his candidacy for re-election in early 1942 to serve in the U.S. Army Air Force as a judge advocate.246 Delegate King likewise abandoned his plans to campaign for a fifth term and rejoined the U.S. Naval Reserve as a lieutenant commander. “I cannot remain in civil life when the training I received as a naval officer may better serve our country’s present needs in active service,” King declared in a radio address to the island.247
Following the conclusion of World War II, King returned to his advocacy of statehood. He served as president of the constitutional convention in 1950, and in 1953 he secured President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s appointment to the territorial governorship. Hawaii had changed considerably after World War II, however, and King found himself a Republican governor dealing with a highly contentious Democratic territorial legislature. The Democratic revolution of 1954 swept into politics the generation of nisei (the American-born children of Japanese immigrants) like Daniel Inouye and Spark Matsunaga, veterans fresh from GI Bill–funded educations and eager to exert their political influence. In fact, Japanese Americans controlled half the seats in the legislature.248 King’s struggles with the legislature ended with his resignation in 1957. He died two years later, barely five months before Hawaii finally attained statehood in August 1959.
Footnotes
181H. Brett Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory, 1898–1959 (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999): 4–5.
182Herring, From Colony to Superpower: 262; Campbell, Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 69–70.
183Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968): 261–262.
184Ernest Andrade Jr., Unconquerable Rebel: Robert W. Wilcox and Hawaiian Politics (Niwot: University Press of Colorado): 55–63; Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 62; Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory: 6.
185Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 35.
186Ibid., 45–46; Daws, Shoal of Time: 261.
187Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 180.
188Herring, From Colony to Superpower: 297; Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 181–182; Helena G. Allen, Sanford Ballard Dole: Hawaii’s Only President, 1844–1926 (Glendale, AZ: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1988): 182; Andrade, Unconquerable Rebel: 107.
189Daws, Shoal of Time: 272–275; Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 184–185; Allen, Sanford Ballard Dole: 190.
190Daws, Shoal of Time: 276–277; Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 186–187; Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 20.
191Roger Bell, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984): 27; Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 186–187.
192Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 188–189.
193Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 21; Daws, Shoal of Time: 279.
194Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory: 25; Bell, Last Among Equals: 29; Andrade, Unconquerable Rebel: 125–27.
195Lori Kamae, The Empty Throne: A Biography of Hawaii’s Prince Cupid (Honolulu, HI: TopGallant Publishing, 1980): 80–87; Andrade, Unconquerable Rebel: 150–161.
196“Robert W. Wilcox,” Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, 1774–Present, http://bioguide. congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000459; A. P. Taylor (Librarian of the Archives of Hawaii), “Biographical Sketch of Robert William Wilcox,” Box 174, Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress Research Collection, Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives.
197Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 37; Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 230–232.
198Tin-Yuke Char and Wai Jane Char, “The First Chinese Contract Laborers in Hawaii, 1852,” Hawaiian Journal of History 9 (1975): 128–134; Michaelyn Pi-Hsia Chou, “The Education of a Senator: Hiram L. Fong from 1906 to 1954” (PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 1980): 50–51.
199Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: 24–26, 45; Ichioka, The Issei: 40, 48.
200Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 232–234; quotation in Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 38.
201Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 235.
202Ibid., 290.
203Daws, Shoal of Time: 290.
204Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 290–291.
205Bell, Last Among Equals: 34; Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Relations: 294; 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
206William Adam Russ Jr., The Hawaiian Republic (1894–1898) And Its Struggle to Win Annexation (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Press, 1961): 370; Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, Hawaii: A History, From Polynesian Kingdom to American State, rev. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961): 194–195.
207Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, John Coit Spooner: Defender of Presidents (New York: University Publishers, 1961): 241–243.
208Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment: 181–182; Bell, Last Among Equals: 41; Stathis, Landmark Legislation: 149; Hawaiian Organic Act, 31 Stat. 141 (1900).
209Bell, Last Among Equals: 39; quotation in Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory: 200.
210Tom Coffman, The Island Edge of America (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003): 9; Andrade, Unconquerable Rebel: 194–196.
211Andrade, Unconquerable Rebel: 230–232.
212Ibid., 242–243.
213Kamae, The Empty Throne: 114–115.
214Ibid., 112, 122; Barbara Bennett Peterson, “Kuhio,” American National Biography, vol. 12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 944.
215Kamae, The Empty Throne: 128, 158; Roderick Matheson, Congressional Visit to Hawaii: 1915 (Honolulu: Advertiser Press, 1915): 3–14.
216Hearings before the House Committee on the Territories, Payment to Hawaii of Federal Road Funds, 71st Cong., 3rd sess. (20, 22 January 1931): 1–20.
217Hearing before the House Committee on the Territories, Land Patents, Territory of Hawaii, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (31 March 1924): 2; House Committee on Public Lands, To Repeal the First Proviso of Section 4 of an Act to Establish a National Park in the Territory of Hawaii, 68th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 442 (1924): 1–2.
218Congressional Record, Appendix, 76th Cong., 2nd sess. (2 April 1940): 1816–1821.
219“Samuel W. King to Arrive Soon From Hawaii,” 1 December 1934, Washington Post: 13.
220Andrade, Unconquerable Rebel: 226; Bell, Last Among Equals: 44–45.
221Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory: 143–144; Daws, Shoal of Time: 296–297.
222H.R. 3090, 57th Cong. (1901); Hearing before the Senate Committee on Territories, Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, 66th Cong., 3rd sess. (14 December 1920): 128.
223Kamae, The Empty Throne: 129–130, 197; Daws, Shoal of Time: 297–299.
224“Hawaii Goes Republican,” 29 November 1929, Christian Science Monitor: 13; Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory: 51.
225Daws, Shoal of Time: 304; Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: 46, 50; Ichioka, The Issei: 71–72.
226Hearing before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (7 July 1921): 448, 451–453; Hearing before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Relative to Chinese Immigration into Hawaii, 65th Cong., 2nd sess. (17 January 1918): 1–3, 48–49; Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Public Law 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921); Coffman, The Island Edge of America: 32.
227Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Exclusion of Immigration from the Philippine Islands, 71st Cong., 2nd sess. (10–12 April, 7–8 May 1930): 238–248, quotation on p. 245; Bell, Last Among Equals: 56.
228Coffman, The Island Edge of America: 33–36; Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: 169–179.
229John S. Whitehead, Completing the Union: Alaska, Hawai‘i, and the Battle for Statehood (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004): 21–22; Daws, Shoal of Time: 323.
230Russell Owen, “Judd Frees All in Massie Case,” 5 May 1932, Boston Globe: 1; Whitehead, Completing the Union: 23; Daws, Shoal of Time: 323–328; quotation in “Democrats Sweep Hawaiian Elections,” 10 November 1932, New York Times: 13.
231Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History: 221–222; Daws, Shoal of Time: 330; Whitehead, Completing the Union: 26.
232Bell, Last Among Equals: 58–60.
233Melendy, Hawaii: America’s Sugar Territory: 224–225; Daws, Shoal of Time: 332.
234Bell, Last Among Equals: 60–61.
235Ibid., 44–45, 56–57; Daws, Shoal of Time: 333.
236“Hawaii Would Enter Union,” 9 July 1910, New York Times: 1; Bell, Last Among Equals: 45; quotation in Whitehead, Completing the Union: 28; Daws, Shoal of Time: 333.
237Ibid., 333–334; Bell, Last Among Equals: 62–64; Whitehead, Completing the Union: 30.
238Congressional Record, House, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (21 August 1937): 9624–9627.
239Bell, Last Among Equals: 64–65.
240Ibid., 66.
241Edward C. Krauss, “Statehood for Hawaii?,” 20 March 1938, Los Angeles Times: A4.
242Whitehead, Completing the Union: 30; Bell, Last Among Equals: 67–72.
243Bell, Last Among Equals: 73–74.
244Public Law 76-694, 54 Stat. 707 (1940); Whitehead, Completing the Union: 15.
245Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: 383.
246Chou, “The Education of a Senator: Hiram L. Fong from 1906 to 1954”: 409–417, 429–443.
247Congressional Record, Appendix, 77th Cong., 2nd sess. (29 October 1942): A3845; “King, Hawaii Delegate, Won’t Seek Reelection,” 9 October 1942, Washington Post: B17.
248Daws, Shoal of Time: 380.